Don’t miss it on your favorite channel : The Floods, the watery soap opera

Forget Dok Som Si Thong (Golden Orange Blossom) and Roi Mai (silk thread), the soap opera not to be missed these days is Naam Tuom (The Floods), which is played on all channels and will bring you all the usual ingredients – the heroes, the drama, the tears, the monsters…- plus the thrill of watching a non-stop reality show. The hero or Phra Aek is the veteran actor Sorayuth, a kind of massive demi-god whose voice resonates like thunder as he crisscrosses the country on boat with a cryptic encircled diagram on his breast : 3. Surrounded by supporting casting, feet in the water, he gives his oracles and predictions as provincial figurants are floating in the background. He is a real Phra Aek, fearless and generous, distributing thousands of rescue bags marked with his diagram, but there are also failed heroes in the drama, like Plodprasob Suraswadee, the billionaire minister of Science, who unsuccessfully tried to take the centre stage by triggering an ill-advised full scale floods alert for the residents of Northern Bangkok on 13th October.
Every keen lakorn watcher knows that a good soap must have a lot of tears, salty water drops rolling down the cheeks for minutes and minutes which express a state of intense internal dismay. The Floods is no exception, and it was a poignant moment to see Kittirat na Ranong, the Deputy Prime Minister, bursting into tears in the arms of a puzzled Japanese investor. Kittirat had stoically contained his emotions for a number of weeks in face of thousands of provincial villagers whose houses half disappeared in flood waters. But the water invading the Hi Tech industrial estate in Ayuthaya was to much to bear. The wall this sensible man had built within himself in order to perform his duty to the best of his abilities burst out with the dyke.
Then who are the bad guys in the story ? Those who sport a moustache of course ! Actually, Chuwit Kamolvisit, again, pointed at the nasty characters lurking in the (flooded) sideways : pirates who raid empty houses and money thirsty boat owners who racket helpless flood victims. Another tempting question is to ask if Yingluck is the nang aek of the drama. It is maybe too early to say ; in any case, she had better be careful nobody else steal the show.

Arnaud Dubus

Who killed ... ?

Who killed king Ananda Mahidol in June 1946 ? We don’t know.

Who killed Muslim leaders Haji Sulong and Ahmad Tohmeena in 1954 ? We don’t know.

Who killed the protesters in October 1973 ? We don’t know.

Who killed Socialist party leader Boonsanong Punyodyana in February 1976 ? We don’t know.

Who killed the students in Thammasart university in October 1976 ? We don’t know.

Who killed Union leader Tanong Po-arn in 1991 ? We don’t know.

Who killed the protesters in May 1992 ? We don’t know.

Who killed muslim lawyer Somchai Neelaipajitr in March 2004 ? We don’t know.

Who killed the Tak Bai protestors in October 2004 ? We don't know.

Who killed Japanese journalist Hiroyuki Muramoto in April 2010 ? We don’t know.

Who killed Italian journalist Fabio Polenghi in May 210 ? We don’t know.

Who killed assistant-nurse Kate Akahad and fiver other persons in Wat Pathum Wanaram in May 2010 ? We don’t know.

What is doing the Royal Thai Police ? They are busy filing lèse-majesté charges against journalist Chiranuch Premchaiporn.

The unbearable lightness of Thai culture

The ownership claim by Thailand of the jeeb gesture, a gracious hand movement of the Ramakien epic, and of the shadow theater using large leather figures (nang yai) is considered as a priority for Mrs Sukumol Kunplome, the new minister of culture. It is hard not to spot an hint of nationalism behind this move as it is a reaction to the registration by Cambodia of the Royal Khmer Ballet and of their own version of shadow theater on the Intangible cultural heritage list of UNESCO in 2008. But more importantly, it allows us to dig into this notion of “Thai culture” which is continuously emphasized by various government agencies as a supposed pillar of the Thai way of being.

In this official format, Thai culture is rather restrictive. It includes mostly the court culture (royal rituals, khon, ramakien, buddhist ceremonies) and some aspects of the commoners culture, as Thai boxing or regional dances. Curiously, some villagers’ traditions are discarded and never presented by officials as part of the Thai heritage, as for instance betel chewing or cock fighting, even if the carrying of betel boxes was, in the past, a sign of rank. This bureaucratic approach to culture divides cultural behaviors and habits into “proper” and “improper” : wearing a sarong is improper but joining palms to wai is proper ; speaking the ratchasap (royal language) is proper but speaking the earthy northeastern Lao dialect is improper. This narrow idea of culture also tends to ignore various creative ventures by young and old artists, who are deemed too uncontrollable to fit the rigid framework. It is not an all-encompassing notion of culture, aiming to celebrate the diversity and creativity of the multiple groups and talents belonging to the country, but a defensive culture, choosy about its picks and always weary of opening up and sharing. In 2002, the minister of Culture, Pongphol Adireksarn, famously proposed a draft law aiming to ban the teaching of Thai boxing and Thai massage to foreigners so that “Thai wisdom stays in the hands of the Thais”.

By claiming ownership of the jeeb gesture and the shadow theatre, the official Thai culture is on its ground : what has been integrated formally in Thai culture has become sacred and inviolable. In face of such dogmatism, it is tempting to hint at the Indian origin of Ramakien - a reality sometimes ignored, as showed by an upper-class lady telling me : “Oh, do they also have Ramayana in India ?” - or at the popularity of shadow theater in the Malay world. Such ownership claims asserted by the Thai minister of culture are a little bit like saying that Celtic music belongs to French Britanny. The same twisted logic explains why some Thai archeologists use the category “Lopburi style” to speak about Angkor style monuments. There is a process of Thai-isation of foreign inputs, which is perfectly fine as long as cultural history is not denied. Nobody owns culture.

Going further, the world of Thai culture is mired in contradictions. As i was asking in a large book store for a copy in Thai of the classic Khun Chang Khun Paen, an employee took a long time to painfully retrieve a unique copy hidden on a shelf. But no less than four different Thai versions of the Chinese epic “Three Kingdoms” (sam kok) were exhibited behind the main cashier counter. Chineseness is an important part of the Thai way of being, especially in large urban areas, but why such a fundamental Thai classic as Khun Chang Khun Paen is not widely available in bookstores ? Should this book be the Jewell of Thai culture ? It is not particular to Thailand. In Indonesia, the great javanese epic “The Book of Centhini”, store of much of the island's ancient culture, had never been translated in bahasa indonesia until a few years ago. It was translated into Indonesian and then French at the end of the 1990s under a project coordinated by writer Elisabeth Inandiak.

Arnaud Dubus

Beyond the call of duty

For some time i have been intrigued by the Thai expression pathibat natee (ปฏิบัติ หน้าที่) or “accomplishing his duty”. Repeatedly said by politicians and bureaucrats during discourses, in front of courts of justice and in reply to embarrassing questions, it has a mantra-like quality that is found in many other overused Thai expressions. In the last few weeks, I found this expression in various news items. One was quoting the current army chief, general Prayuth Chan-Ocha, explaining that military officers and rank and file military should not be worried by the coming change of government, in regard to the brutal repression of the Red shirts demonstrations of April-May last year. “Why should we be worried, because we have accomplished our duty ?”, he said. In another article, it was said that the policemen who killed a seven year old boy during an operation to catch a drug trafficker in the course of the infamous “war on drugs” in 2003, had received reduced sentences of a few months in jail by the court, because they killed the boy “while accomplishing their duty”.

Obviously, something was amiss. Can we say that a taxi driver who crush a passer-by on the road can be forgiven because he was “accomplishing his duty” - driving his car in quest of customers ? In which country the killing of tenth of mostly unarmed civilians by security forces would be considered as part of their duties ? There seems to be, here, a play on the words, a semantic trick to justify the unjustifiable.

Of course, much depends on what meaning you give to “duty” ? When I was a conscript in the French army in the mid-eighties, a young officer made a speech during the very first day of our training period. He said that, if an officer gave us an order to shoot into a crowd of civilians, he hoped that we would have the common sense and determination to refuse to follow the order “because the French army is a citizens’ army”. Obviously, for this officer, duty included something else that the blind obedience to whatever command was received from the hierarchy. So there is a sense of duty which is wider than the narrow focus on “doing his job” without any considerations of the broader implications. This higher sense of duty is based on the respect of the right of others, on some basic moral principles, on the use of the brain and on the will to be not only a mechanical part of a larger machine. In Thailand, the narrow focus on “duty” appears to be mostly a corporatist protective tool for the bureaucracy : whatever wrong is done, there is always a way to land back on his feet by saying “Well, there was a large loss of life, but I stuck to the bureaucratic rules”. To the letter of the rules, that is, but not to the spirit, because you can always manipulate the letter the way you want.

Another element is the absence of a built-in punishment system in case of wrong doing. A journalist who distorts facts will be fired. A businessman who invests in loosing ventures will be ruined. He won’t be able to cover his failure by saying that he “did his duty”. “Accomplishing his duty” has then to be seen as the fig leaf of bureaucrats. And every time we hear this expression, we should enter rebellion.

Arnaud Dubus

The imagined world of Thai soap operas

A striking feature of most of the Thai soap operas is the extremely stereotyped social milieu they represent. 90 % of the soap operas are set in upper bourgeois milieu, displaying very wealthy families living in palatial homes surrounded by a bevy of maids and servants. It does not actually represent an existing social milieu, but is more an imagined high class-society, where young men and women devote their whole time to romantic intrigues and, seemingly, are disencumbered from the contingencies of professional life. This idealization of the social setting is reinforced by the endless reproduction of the same features from one series to another. The wide diversity of the life situations in the country is obliterated and replaced by a narrow range of models.

Another trait is the constant reminder of the rules of social hierarchy. There are often two sets of people, the “masters” and the “servants”. Within the masters’ world, there is strife and competition, joy and tears, unions and break up. The servants are only shown as a reflection of their masters’ world : they gossip about them, assess their behavior with a childish naivety in the secret confines of the kitchen, but their own life and destiny have no interest in the plot. There is only one kind of interaction between the two groups : the servants are attending, with submissiveness and obedience, their masters. They cater to their every whim and never revolt. They are there to enhance the social greatness of their masters.

The characters are as much stereotyped as the social milieu. There is the mother, sporting a khunying-style hairdo, wise and protective, who has long accepted the vagaries of her husband. There are the daughters - either the dutiful one, pride of her parents, who has only one aspiration : to lead a quiet and moral life with her husband ; either the bitch-type, inclined on stealing husbands and destroying the life of harmonious couples. The sons follow a similar dual pattern.

The locations in which the plot is developing are also limited : the splendid living rooms where discussions within the families or with a few selected visitors – often prospective fiancés – take place in the comfort of leather sofas or mother-of-pearl inlaid Chinese furniture at the foot of extravagant neo-classical winding staircases, the VVIP hospital rooms where one of the character will recover from some ailment, the sport cars where the trendy teenagers will tease each other or quarrel… You won’t see them walking in a normal street among normal people, or shop at Big C. They are living on a higher plane, like demi-gods on the flanks of Mount Meru.

One of the messages of these series is that the existing social hierarchy is a fact of life, a natural evidence which does not need to be justified. The idealized setting is presented as a model to get inspiration from or even to copy. Verbal expressions, physical attitudes, type of furniture and indoor design, dressing style and life situations are being reproduced in real life, not by the actual upper middle classes, but more by a petty and middle bourgeoisie avid to project the image of them playing in a superior category.

Interestingly, the few series which are taking place in the “countryside” are also set in a unreal, idealized world : sprawling traditional wooden mansions where the up-country masters would wear traditional costumes. Servants in Rama IV clothing style would prostrate themselves at their feet. Probably nowhere in today Thailand you can see such scenes outside of theaters and cultural centers. Don’t expect here to have a glimpse of the half urbanized provincial small towns where rice fields are fast replaced by housing villages, and which constitute the current reality of much of Thai countryside. Again, reflecting the real world is not the aim, but rather to influence the real worlds with imagined models.

Perhaps, the creators of these series consider that they have to make their audiences dream or aspire to higher materialistic success and that they must not be reminded of their real situation in life. Perhaps, the words of the consumer products companies which sponsor these series are dictating the rules of the game. The extreme focus on syrupy romantic intrigues leave no space for hints of social issues (drugs, inequality, poverty, aids, relation between various ethnic communities, between Thai and Farangs…) and even less for political content. Nobody expects a soap opera to deal with being and nothingness, but it would be imaginable that it stays enjoyable and, at the same time, treats his viewers as more adult.

Arnaud Dubus

Willam J. Klausner on Thai Troubled Politics (part 2)

Of prime importance in beginning the process towards achieving mutual trust and empathy is the need to decipher the underlying causes of the so-called rural-urban divide and to address them. As a son-in-law of the northeast, I will focus on isaan when commenting on rural society. The stereotype of villagers largely held by those in urban society must be challenged and overcome. Urban society is largely in the throes of a serious cultural lag as it still sees rural folk as uneducated and narrow minded provincials. Such a view no longer represents either the social or political reality. Rural society has undergone a cosmic change during the past half century which urban dwellers often simply refuse to recognize or accept. Rural society has evolved from a barter focused sustainable economy to a cash and consumer oriented society. Mutual help/reciprocal labor has given way to hired laborers who even follow service hours. Family labor has markedly decreased as the norm of five or six children has given the way to only one, two or three children at the most, and the younger generation is now pursuing higher education and careers beyond the village. The limit of a four year primary education has long since passed as many of the younger generation have completed high school and gone on to college and university.

Villagers’ understanding of the world beyond their rural confines has expanded significantly as mobility markedly increased beginning in the mid-sixties. Villagers have left to work in the provincial centers, in Bangkok and further abroad in Middle East, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan etc… In most villages today, off-farm income in greater than in-farm income. And advances in communication technologies and rural electrification have resulted in villagers no longer being dependent on the rural focused bamboo radio or rice harp. They have become connected and conversant with urban worlds via television, newspapers, radios, computers/internet, DVDs, mobile and land line phones.

Rural society more and more, has taken on the trappings of the city with increased gambling, drugs, debt, competition and consumerism etc… Villagers have, thus, become “cosmopolitan villagers”, and when found working in urban environment, they become “rural cosmopolitans”. One should remember former villagers working in Bangkok are generally in low paid jobs and identify themselves with the urban poor. One might go even further and say villagers have a better understanding of what it means to be a Thai citizen, in its fullest and most inclusive sense, as they understand both worlds unlike urban folk who have become provincial ensconced in their more narrow environment.

If those in urban areas are to fully understand and empathize with villagers, there must be a realization that villagers, besides being better educated and tuned into the world outside, have overcome their antipathy to confrontation and to a total reliance on karma as an explanation of their disadvantaged state. The villagers are increasingly ready to openly confront authority. While there have been several factors that have influenced such attitudinal changes, the fact they now have political cover to challenge and confront authority should be recognized.

However, the villagers’ main argument is with officialdom, persons of influence, including businessmen at the provincial level, who treat them with not so disguised disdain. The villagers no longer have to rely on the indirect weapons of the weak with dealing with authority, including songs and folk tales where those in positions of authority are bested by common folk. They are now ready to demand that they be respected and treated fairly ; that they be valued for their local wisdom ; that their dignity and worth be recognized. They want those they vote for to remain in power and to respond to their needs in terms of gaining a larger share of the material benefits pie. Though they have an increased level of social and political consciousness, this does not mean, at this stage, that they are committed to structural changes necessary to bring about liberal democratic governance.
If perceptions of rural society changes become more realistic, perhaps we will increasingly view the glass of the Thai body politic as half full, not half empty. I would be happy to define further important changes in village society over the past decades if time permits and it is deemed relevant to do so.

Lastly, one might profitably discuss the role play of the Sangha as a factor militating against resolution of conflicts and tensions in Thai society today. At the village level, the monks, with a few exception, no longer play a role as community leaders in the secular lives of the villagers. With the exception of meditation adepts and charismatic “development monks” engaged in community development programs, most of the rural Sangha confines itself to religious teachings and participation in rituals and ceremonies. Many northeastern temples have only a few elder monks in residence. This change in role play has been influenced by the intrusion of the State in areas previously the province of Sangha, increased educational opportunities for the youth and a cash and consumer oriented society. In Bangkok, resident monks from the northeast have become entangled in confrontational and divisive behavior as they openly participate in political protests. It would appear, to paraphrase an old saying, “you can take the monk out of the village, but you cannot take the village out of the monk”. As with their lay protestors, the monks have their own hidden agendas. As they join in protesting and confronting authority, they are indirectly protesting against an authoritarian gentocracy that administers the Sangha.

It maybe pointed out that a majority of the student body at the two Buddhist universities in Bangkok come from the northeast and many more live in Wats almost exclusively composed of northeast monks and temple boys, for example, Wat Sapathum, Wat Noranad, Wat Prasrimahatad, Wat Takian etc… Such political involvement of monks is in contradiction of the rules of discipline (vinai) and to a previously unwritten agreement on the part of the State authorities, lay Buddhist leaders and the Council of Elders that any political involvement was both inappropriate and forbidden. During recent political protests, monks from up-country, as well as Bangkok based monks, were actively involved and, yet, the Sangha authorities issued no statement cautioning monks to avoid such involvement. This does not bode well for the future of the Sangha, a traditional moral voice for moderation and conciliation, has become enmeshed in divisive, political conflicts.

I hope the above comments on the not so controlled chaos of the Thai body politic today will be taken in the constructive spirit intended.

Professor William J. Klausner
Senior Fellow, ISIS Thailand
30th September 2010

William J. Klausner on Thai Politics at ISIS (Chula U), Part One

I wish to thanks Ajahn Jay (Thitinan Pongsudhirak) for providing me with the opportunity to participate in this conference and to further a dialogue I have pursued with Paul (Wedel) and especially with Jim (Stent) who has been a favorite interlocutor over the past several decades.

As an aging absent minded professor who has lived in Thailand for fifty years and is now well into his anecdote age, the trajectory of the past weighs more heavily than that of the future.

However, that can be useful in interpreting Thailand’s troubles today. The past is very much a central part of the present conflicts and tensions in Thai society. Despite the dramatic transformation of Thai society in the past half century and the realization that “the future is not what is was”, the past, as William Faulkner noted, “is not dead. It’s not even past”. The traditional past was rooted in hierarchy, in both its values and institutions. Though there was a surface stability, social, economic, political and legal inequalities prevailed.

These hierarchical structures and values have a remarkable staying power and are ever present in traditional centers of power as they shape the behavior, attitudes and perspectives of bureaucracy, police, army, judiciary, medical profession etc… However they have come under increasing pressure and challenge from an opposing set of antithetical core values associated with globalization, civil society and liberal democracy that emphasize individualism, egalitarianism, rule of law, popular participation, good governance. In the long run, it will be the resolution of this conflict and the form it takes that will determine both the style of governance and the extent to which there will be a more just and equitable society. Given the accelerating pressures, including a rising political and social consciousness on the part of the rural electorate, reforms in all sectors of society will ultimately have to be undertaken, however long it takes and despite continuing opposition.

Such reforms will be necessary across the board in education, in the legal sphere, in economic and political structures and in the channeling outside input into policy formulation and implementation. There must be also the political will to undertake these reforms in an atmosphere of civil and rational discourse. As one of the characters of the Italian novel “The Guepard” cautioned an establishment elder : “If you want things to stay the same, things will have to change”.

At present, the above conflict between the two forces mentioned has been somewhat muted and under the radar. Civil society and third force centrist elements have found little social and political space to make their voices heard. Though there are those who are truly committed to liberal democratic values in all color co-ordinated camps, they do not represent a critical mass. There seems to be little effort to wean away these democratic elements and have them join together with civil society to forge a centrist political force to be reckoned with. Despite the banners extolling democracy held high by one and all, the struggle today seems to be rather one for power and authority with little expectation that there would be any significant change in the form of governance. Mutual trust and empathy, as well as readiness to conciliate, compromise and accommodate, are largely absent. Zero sum attitudes prevail.

Whether in the short or long term, one cannot proceed towards reconciliation resolution and productive synergy of opposing forces unless there is mutual trust and a deeper understanding of the fissures and divisions in all their complexities so prevalent in Thai society today. (to follow…).

Interview with Khun Sombat Boongamanong, the man behind the Red sundays

Sombat Boongamanong has become one of the most active, well…, activist supporting the Red shirts in the aftermath of the 19th of may military crackdown on the demonstrators in Rajprasong. He has launched the creative and well attended “Red Sundays”, during which, every week end, Red supporters are gathering in one city and organizing various pacifist activities.
Last week end in Pattaya, the program sounded very attractive : female militants clad in Red bikinis were supposed to invade Jomtien beach by the hundreds and swim in the brown waters of Pattaya’s seashore. The reality was a bit more conform to the Thai cultural reserve and reap-royness. Charming Red ladies did bathe in the sea but in Tee Shirts, pants and skirts. Which was nice enough to watch at.
On the more political side, we had the opportunity to interview the organizer of the event, Khun Sombat Boongamanong about the meaning of Wan Athit See Daeng, and the information war between the militants and the State powers.


Question : What are the Red shirts aiming at with this kind of activities ? Why did you get yourself involved in the Red shirts movement ?

Khun Sombat : I am a citizen. Many of the Red shirts leaders have been arrested. And so, as citizens, our problem now is to know how we can get organized. I think that we have to become ourselves leaders, we have to organize our own activities and invite our citizens friends to join and do the same.

Question : The war within Thai society is not a war taking place in the streets, but it is a war on the communication battlefield, a war of information, propaganda and communication technology. In this war, the State powers seem to have difficulties to fight their opponents. They don’t seem to understand how to use efficiently the communication technology tools like twitter, facebook and so on. It looks like these State powers are loosing the battle. They don’t seem either to know how to win the support of journalists. What is your view ?

Khun Sombat : I agree. I don’t think it is a civil war. It is a war of understanding, but it is also a class war, but not to a point of violence as to be a civil war. We have to discuss with each other. In Thailand, there is a continuity in the political development of the country. I think we are now reaching the final phase, because almost all the social classes have fought or are fighting for democracy. There is only now the lower classes left to join the struggle for democracy.
And we, who belong to the middle classes, are supporting the struggle of the lower classes. But we want to use the power of explanation, the power of knowledge to transform our country. We do not want to wage an armed struggle or use violence. In any case, I think this country has to change. But we want this change to happen through pacific actions. And if we want to wage a pacific struggle, we have to wage it on the information field. If it does not work, then maybe we will have to use force. Nevertheless, I think that now we still have the choice between these two paths. We want to base our struggle on communication and knowledge.

Interview by Arnaud Dubus

Radio Program : Media and Politics in Thailand

Pour les francophones, un programme de 25 minutes sur Médias et Politique en Thaïlande pour l'Atelier des Médias pour Radio France Internationale.

http://www.rfi.fr/emission/20100814-couverture-internationale-crise-thailandaise

Voice TV program on the killing of Fabio Polenghi

This is a program which has been broadcasted at the 7:00 pm news bulletin on 25th of August on Voice TV channel, received either through PSI satellite dish, or on internet.

http://www.voicetv.co.th/content/20009/ย้อนรอยการตาย‘ฟาบิโอโพเลนกิ’ช่างภาพอิตาลี

Murders, Lies and Mischievousness in the Land of Multiple Standards

The dilemma when you are a government agency faced with a hugely embarrassing situation is to do or not to do a press conference. Both options have their advantages and drawbacks. Speaking to the medias breaks a choking silence, but then you have to provide some substantial details to feed the hunger of journalists. Not speaking to the media allow you to avoid compromising yourself, but then you look uncooperative.

The DSI, the “Thai FBI” as we say, chose to speak to the medias. The problem is that they had nothing to tell them on the topic announced : the circumstances of the deaths of 91 people during the April May Red shirts demonstrations, among them two foreign journalists, video reporter Hiroyuki Muramoto and Italian photographer Fabio Polenghi.
From the start, the elegant Naras announced that the “investigations on both foreigners deaths “were not yet complete” and that he could not provide any information. This investigation has begun more than four months ago for Hiroyuki and three months ago for Fabio. Fabio forensic report was written on 21th of May, two days after his death.
How is it possible that the DSI still does not have any details on the cases ? What have they done during these last months ? Well, they surely were busy chasing “terrorists” who have burnt to the ground Central World department store and arresting Red shirts demonstrators here and there. Fair enough, but what about the many families who lost some relatives in the massacre ? Are not they worth the DSI attention ?

Coming to Fabio Polenghi's case, Khun Naras gave actually a new piece of information : “we could not find the bullet who killed him in his body, and so we have no idea of the kind of caliber”, he said. Well, it surely makes everything simpler. No bullets, no identification of the possible shooter, no headache. “Lack of evidence” will be the final word, and don't count on the Italian embassy to push the case.

Actually, according to a reliable source, the DSI is not to be blamed. They are also “victims”, pressured between the medias, especially Foreign medias but also increasing Thai medias, and the military-led CRES who does not want to face the fact that their men shot at demonstrators and journalists. For them, the still mysterious “men in black” are responsible for most of the violence. To support this thesis, they, for instance, said that the Cable TV building on Rajdamri road, less than thirty meters from the spot where Fabio, hit by a bullet, collapsed at 11:58 am on the 19th of May, was on that day a stronghold of the Black shirts. We checked and it is simply not true, at least according to the building manager and his security staff who were occupying the building without any interruption on the 19th of May. “The soldiers came around 2.30 pm, forcing the doors to look for Red shirts and Black shirts. They could not find anyone”, he says. Nevertheless, according to a Foreign journalist accompanying the military on Rajdamri at this time of the day said that he saw a few men in black being arrested by the military a few meters from the building.

So we are left with this : the CRES is giving the tone and no government agency is authorized to give any information unless cleared by the CRES first. And the circumstances of the killing of both Hiroyuki Muramoto and Fabio Polenghi are apparently embarrassing enough for the army to launch a major cover up operation. The Thai army is far from being the only army in the world to shy away from its own misdeeds. Just remember Tyler, in Afghanisthan, whose death by “friendly fire”, was only accepted publicly by the US military after the press exposed the case.

This cover up strategy is bound to backfire, as the more the army is trying to create a smokescreen, the more suspicion within the country and in the international community will raise. The Thai military, formatted by a mindset frozen some forty of fifty years ago, have always had a hard time to comprehend their rapidly modernizing country. But this time, because of the explosion of social medias and the greater difficulty to control public opinion, the soldiers are definitely out in the cold.

Arnaud Dubus (in Bangkok)

Who Killed Italian Photographer Fabio Polenghi ?

There is an interesting article on Fabio Polenghi on New Mandala website :
http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2010/08/17/who-killed-italian-photographer-fabio-polenghi/#comments

Journaliste tué en Thaïlande : Omerta d'Etat

La mort du photographe indépendant italien Fabio Polenghi tué par balles à Bangkok sera-t-elle un jour élucidée? Fabio Polenghi a été tué le 19 mai juste avant onze heures alors qu’il courait, avec d’autres journalistes et des Chemises rouges(manifestants antigouvernementaux), pour échapper à des tirs.

Ce jour là, les militaires, chargés par le gouvernement d’Abhisit Vejjajiva de «nettoyer» le quartier commercial de Bangkok occupé depuis près de deux mois par les Rouges, progressent sur l’avenue en tirant sur les manifestants armés de lance pierres et de cocktails molotov. Pendant sa course, Fabio est touché par une balle et s’effondre. Transporté par des collègues et des manifestants, il décède de sa blessure à l’hôpital. Deux jours après la mort de l’Italien, l’Institut de médecine légale de la police effectue une autopsie. Le lendemain, le corps est incinéré, en présence de sa sœur Isabella, de ses amis et de ses collègues. Trois mois plus tard, la police refuse toujours de rendre publique l’autopsie.

«L’enquête n’est pas terminée», explique le colonel Naras Savestanan, le numéro deux du Département des Enquêtes Spéciales (DSI), le FBI thaïlandais, lequel se dit incapable de répondre à des questions aussi cruciales que le type de balles retrouvées dans le corps de Fabio, l’angle et le lieu d’origine du tir. D’autres questions concerne le positionnement des tireurs d’élite de l’armée qui ont abattu plusieurs manifestants ce jour-là et celui des mystérieuses Chemises noires, le bras armé des Rouges. Mais là aussi, pas de réponse ou alors très vagues.

Qui a donc tué Fabio Polenghi ? Une enquête menée par des collègues et des amis de Fabio donne quelques éléments de réponse. Fabio a été tué par balles dans une zone ou les Chemises noires utilisaient essentiellement des grenades M. 79, lesquelles ont tué au moins un militaire et grièvement blessé le journaliste canadien Chandler Vandergrift, et des M. 16.

Le 19 mai, ces Chemises noires occupaient la station de métro aérien Rajdamri, à environ 425mètres de l’endroit ou Fabio a été tué (un M16 devient imprécis à partir de 100 mètres, sauf s’il est équipé de lunettes de visée). De leur côté, le 19 mai, vers onze heures du matin, les centaines de militaires déployés pour l’opération de nettoyage progressaient dans la partie sud de l’avenue Rajdamri et au travers du parc urbain Lumphini, qui couvre le flanc sud-est de l’avenue.

Parallèlement, des tireurs d’élite de l’armée, postés sur des bâtiments environnant Rajdamri, faisaient également feu sur les manifestants Rouges et les dizaines de journalistes occupant l’avenue. /«Il est plus probable que le journaliste ait été touché par les soldats sécurisant, au niveau du sol, l’avenue Rajdamri. Je ne vois pas pourquoi des tireurs d’élite le prendraient particulièrement pour cible»,/ estime un journaliste, expert des affaires militaires qui se trouvait avec les soldats quand ceux-ci remontaient l’avenue.

S’il est révélé un jour, le calibre de la balle qui a tué Fabio Polenghi n’est pas l’élément déterminant, car les Chemises noires et les militaires peuvent avoir utilisé des armes similaires. En revanche, le point d’entrée de la balle, la configuration de la blessure, la distance et l’angle de tir, qui pourraient donner des précisions sur l’origine du tir, sont primordiaux. En l’absence de ces données, il n’y aura pas de certitudes sur l’identité de ceux qui ont tué le journaliste italien.

Le DSI, chargé du dossier, ne pipe mot. Pourquoi ce département, considéré par les Rouges et certains médias, comme proche du Parti démocrate du Premier ministre Abhisit Vejjajiva, semble-t-il aussi embarrassé par ce cas qui a attiré l’attention des médias internationaux et des organisations de défense des droits des journalistes ? Publier la vérité sur les circonstances de la mort du photographe serait, apparemment, gênante pour le gouvernement et pour les militaires qui contrôlent en sous-main le pays.

Le général Anupong Paochinda, issu du 21ème régiment d’infanterie (Corps des gardes de la reine), est chef de l’armée de terre depuis 2007. Il a été nommé peu après le coup d’Etat de septembre 2006 qui a évincé l’ex-Premier ministre Thaksin Shinawatra. Le 1er octobre prochain, le général Prayuth Chan-Ocha, frère d’armes d’Anupong et maître d’œuvre des opérations militaires du 10 avril et du 13 au 19 juin derniers – 90 morts dont les journalistes Hiroyuki Muramoto et Fabio Polenghi et au moins cinq militaires - prendra la succession de son mentor à la tête de l’armée de terre. Pendant sept ans, l’élite du Corps des gardes de la Reine aura donc le contrôle du poste le plus puissant des forces armées du pays. Du jamais vu dans l’histoire militaire du royaume et qui n’est pas sans exciter de féroces jalousies au sein du corps des officiers.

Arnaud Dubus (à Bangkok)

Copyright Libération

ใครฆ่าฟาบีโอ โปเลนกิ นักข่าวชาวอิตาลี

ความตายของนายฟาบีโอ โปเลนกิ ช่างภาพอิสระจะนับเป็นกรณีหนึ่งหรือไม่ในบรรดาเหตุการณ์ประวัติศาสตร์ปัจจุบันของประเทศไทยที่ไม่มีข้ออธิบาย ฟาบีโอ โปเลนกิถูกยิงจนเสียชีวิตเมื่อวันที่ 19 พฤษภาคม ก่อนเวลา 11 นาฬิกาตรงเพียงครู่เดียว ทั้ง ๆ ที่เขาก็วิ่งกับนักข่าวคนอื่น ๆ และคนเสื้อแดง (ผู้ประท้วงต้านรัฐบาล) เพื่อหลบกระสุนจริง วันนั้น รัฐบาลนายอภิสิทธิ์ เวชชาชีวะสั่งให้ทหาร “เก็บกวาด” ย่านธุรกิจการค้ากรุงเทพฯ ที่ถูกคนเสื้อแดงใช้พื้นที่อยู่นานสองเดือน ทหารกระชับวงล้อมเข้ามาทีละน้อยด้วยการยิงกระสุนใส่ผู้ชุมนุมติดอาวุธหินและขวดระเบิดมือ ขณะที่ฟาบีโอกำลังวิ่ง ก็ถูกกระสุนเข้าลูกหนึ่ง แล้วล้มลง มีเพื่อน ๆ นักข่าวและคนเสื้อแดงหามและพาเขาไปโรงพยาบาล เขาเสียชีวิตจากการบาดเจ็บ
สองวันหลังจากการตายของชาวอิตาลีผู้นี้ สถาบันนิติเวชก็ทำการชันสูตรศพ วันรุ่งขึ้น ร่างของฟาบีโอก็ถูกเผาโดยมีพี่สาวอิซาแบล เพื่อนพ้องและเพื่อนนักข่าวมาร่วมงาน จากนั้นสามเดือนผ่านไป ตำรวจยังคงปฏิเสธที่จะเปิดเผยผลการชันสูตรศพ « การสอบสวนยังไม่เสร็จสิ้น » พล.ต.อ. ณรัชต์ เศวตนันท์ รองอธิบดีกรมสอบสวนคดีพิเศษ (ดีเอสไอ) เอฟบีไอแบบไทยก็ยังไม่สามารถให้คำตอบต่อคำถามโหดๆ อย่าง ประเภทของกระสุนที่พบในศพของฟาบีโอ วิถีกระสุน คำถามอื่น ๆ นั้นเกี่ยวกับตำแหน่งของนักแม่นปืนของกองกำลังที่ฆ่าผู้ชุมนุมไปหลายคนในวันเดียวกัน รวมถึงตำแหน่งของคนเสื้อดำผู้เป็นแขนติดอาวุธให้กับคนเสื้อแดง แต่นั้นก็อีก ไม่มีคำตอบใด ๆ หรือเป็นคำตอบเบลอ ๆ ไม่ชัด
กรมสอบสวนคดีพิเศษ (ดีเอสไอ) หรือ เอฟบีไอไทยนั้นผู้มีความรับผิดชอบต่อคดีกลับเงียบกริบ ทำไมกรมการนี้ผู้ที่ถูกมองจากคนเสื้อแดงและสื่อบางหน่วยว่ามีความใกล้ชิดกับพรรคประชาธิปัตย์ของนายอภิสิทธิ์ เวชชาชีวะจึงดึงดูดความสนใจจากสื่อต่างประเทศและองค์กรพิทักษ์สิทธิเสรีภาพของนักข่าว บางที อาจเป็นเพราะความจริงที่ปรากฏอาจสร้างความเสื่อมเสียแก่รัฐบาลและทหารที่คุมประเทศอยู่ในมือ พลเอกอนุพงษ์ เผ่าจินดา กรมทหารราบที่ 21 รักษาพระองค์ (ในสมเด็จพระนางเจ้าสิริกิติ์ พระบรมราชินีนาถ-ร.21 รอ.) เป็นหัวหน้ากองทัพทหารราบตั้งแต่ปี 2550 ขึ้นดำรงตำแหน่งหลังรัฐประหารเดือนกันยายน 2549 ที่ขับไล่อดีตนายกรัฐมนตรี พล.ต.ท. ทักษิณ ชินวัตร ผู้เป็นที่นิยมและเป็นประชานิยม (และทุจริต) กล่าวถึงพลเอกประยุทธ์ จันทร์โอชา เพื่อนกองทัพของพลเอกอนุพงษ์ และเป็นผู้กำกับการปฏิบัติการของทหารเมื่อวันที่ 10 เมษายน และระหว่างวันที่ 13-19 พฤษภาคมที่ผ่านมายังให้มีผู้เสียชีวิต 90 คนโดยมีนักข่าวฮิโรยูกิ มุระโมโต นายฟาบีโอ โปเลนกิ และทหารอย่างน้อยจำนวน 5 นาย เขาจะได้รับช่วงต่อจากหัวหน้าโป้ปดกรมทหารราบของตนในวันที่ ๑ ตุลาคมที่จะถึงนี้ นับไปอีก 7 ปีที่ยอดทหารรักษาพระองค์ในสมเด็จพระนางเจ้าสิริกิติ์พระบรมราชินีนาถผู้นี้ จะได้คุมตำแหน่งอำนาจสูงสุดของกองกำลังทหารไทย เป็นสิ่งที่ไม่เคยปรากฏในประวัติศาสตร์ทหารราชอาณาจักรไทย และยังสร้างความอิจฉาริษยาร้ายท่ามกลางเหล่าข้าราชการ
แล้วใครฆ่านายฟาบีโอ โปเลนกิ เพื่อนนักข่าวและเพื่อน ๆ ของเขาได้คำตอบบางประการจากการสืบเสาะ ฟาบีโอถูกยิงด้วยกระสุนในย่านที่คนเสื้อดำใช้อาวุธโดยเฉพาะเครื่องยิงระเบิดเอ็ม 16 ลูกระเบิดเอ็ม 79 ซึ่งระเบิดชนิดหลังได้ฆ่านายทหารไปหนึ่งนาย และทำให้นักข่าวชาวแคนาดา นายชองด์แลร์ วานแดร์กริฟท์ บาดเจ็บสาหัส วันที่ 19 พฤษภาคม คนเสื้อดำใช้พื้นที่สถานีรถไฟฟ้าราชดำริ ซึ่งห่างจากสถานที่ ๆ ฟาบีโอถูกฆ่า 425 เมตร ส่วนเวลาประมาณ 11 โมงเช้า ในวันที่ 19 พฤษภาคม มีกำลังทหารบางกลุ่มกระจายอยู่เพื่อปฏิบัติการกวาดล้างได้ก็รุกเรื่อยมายังด้านใต้ของถนนราชดำริ (ด้านที่จรดกับถนนพระราม 4 - ผู้แปล) และฝ่าสวนสาธารณะลุมพินี ซึ่งครอบคลุมด้านตะวันตกเฉียงใต้ของถนน
ในเวลาเดียวกัน นักแม่นปืนจำนวนหนึ่งของกองกำลังประจำอยู่บนอาคารย่านราชดำริยิงออกมาใส่ผู้ชุมนุมเสื้อแดง และนักข่าวที่อยู่บนถนน "เป็นไปได้ว่าฟาบีโอถูกกระสุนที่ยิงมาจากทหารราบที่อยู่ที่บนถนนราชดำริ ผมมองไม่ออกว่าทำไมนักแม่นปืนจะจำเพาะเจาะจงยิงเขา" นักข่าวผู้หนึ่งประเมินเหตุการณ์ หน่วยทหารรบพิเศษประจำพื้นที่ที่มีกลุ่มทหารราบซึ่งหันย้อนศรไปทางเหนือของถนนราชดำริอยู่แล้ว อาจเป็นที่ทราบกันในวันใดวันหนึ่งเกี่ยวกับขนาดเส้นผ่าศูนย์กลางของกระสุนที่สังหารนายฟาบีโอ โปเลนกิ แต่นั้นก็ไม่ใช่ปัจจัยสุดท้ายที่ให้คำตอบ เพราะคนเสื้อดำและทหารสามารถใช้อาวุธเดียวกัน สิ่งสำคัญกว่านั้นคือ จุดที่กระสุนถูกยิงมา ลักษณะที่เกิดของบาดแผลและวิถีกระสุน คือสิ่งที่ให้ความกระจ่างว่ากระสุนมาจากที่ใด ในเมื่อไม่มีรายละเอียดดังกล่าว ย่อมจะไม่อาจแน่ใจถึงที่มาที่ไปของผู้ที่ฆ่านักข่าวอิตาลี
หลังจากที่นายฟาบีโอถูกกระสุนเมื่อวันที่ 19 พฤษภาคมนั้น ชายชาวเอเชียผู้หนึ่ง รีบรุดเข้าไปเอากล้องถ่ายรูป Canon 5D จากมือของเขา แล้วร่วมกับคนอื่น ๆ พากันนำเขาออกไปจากจุดที่มีการยิง สิ่งหนึ่งที่สืบทราบโดยนักข่าวหลายคน และจากการสัมภาษณ์หน่วยทหารรบพิเศษบ่งชี้ว่า บุคคลดังกล่าวไม่ใช่นักข่าว และไม่ใช่เพียงผู้ที่ต้องการฉวยโอกาสจากสถานการณ์เพื่อขโมยกล้องที่มีราคาหลายพันยูโร

Pagmaa Demchig เขียน
สกุณา คำรักษ์ แปล

Photos by : Thilo Thielke (Der Spiegel), Ken Ishii et Wally Santana(Associated Press)

Maps : Courtesy of Filip Heringuez

Al Jazeera TV Report on Motorcycle taxis and Politics

Aela's Callan Bangkok correspondent for Al Jazeera has produced an interesting program on Motorcyle taxis and politics in Thailand, figuring an interview with Harvard University's Phd candidate Claudio Sopranzetti.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iwy6jGt5Aps

I Love Thai Police (3). Never As Good As the Third Time.

As says the song, it is never as good as the third time, especially if you get it three times. The fine, I mean. After months of frustrations and failure to get fined for traffic rule breaking, I have been fulfilled beyond my wildest dreams on Thursday, 19th.
I was with my wife, Noo, on the road to Sisaket, in order to investigate the assassination of a local Red shirts leader. This was a long way and because of the excitement of the mission, I was driving fast. Then somewhere after Saraburi, the famed tamruat thanon luang, with their nice brown and yellow cars and their black beret, caught me.
I had already warned my wife. I won’t speak anything to the policemen. I will play the mute, as when I said I am a journalist they released me or even when I just argue in Thai they let me go (see previous episodes). So, complete silence this time, only smiles and gestures.
I pulled off the road and smiled at a slightly overweight black beret. Things were smooth. With no verbal reaction from me, they wrote the form and said “124 km/h”. Not bad. I duly paid the 200 bahts fine, and we hit the road again. Noo immortalized the event with the digital camera.
Then, barely 40 minutes later, another squad of black berets caught me again. “128 km/h”, said a policeman. I could not really hid my joy and he noticed it. I paid again the 200 bahts due and had my picture taken with my new friend, the highway policeman.
That was not the end of it, as, having arrived in Surin and visited the market there, I was surprised to find a white paper on the front windshield. “Wrong parking”, said the paper. Actually I could not really understand as I was correctly parked, and many cars around my Peugeot 406 had escaped the wrath of Surin’s keepers of the law. But in Surin, indeed, we don’t joke with the rule of law. And that was a third 200 bahts fine. But it had now become routine. I throw the paper in the back of the car and decided not to pay, and we fled speedily toward our Sisaket destination.

Arnaud Dubus

Claudio Sopranzetti : Moto taxis and Politics

Interesting article on the Politics of Motorcycle Taxis in Thailand on New Mandala website :
http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/

The Strange Case of Benny Moafi

From his mid-eastern origine, Benny Moafi has kept an inextinguable energy and deep blue, dreamy eyes. The man, with a passion for languages and for photocopies, is a Swedish Iranian businessman who lives in Thailand since 1994. And against all odds, he is still living in the country. This is despite having been arrested in 2000 on what he says were trumped accusations of holding a fake passport and robbery. Sentenced to 22 years in jail, he spent the next 10 years of his life behind bars of various Thai prison.
But this strong willed man decided not to be broken by Thai jail despite the harsh conditions and the beatings he endured. In his cell, he began to learn speaking, reading and writing proper Thai until becoming totally fluent. Then, he registered by letter at Sukhotai Thammatirat university and passed a bachelor degree in Thai law. Then, he simply became a lawyer for himself and his fellow prisonners. To this day, he has filed 206 cases against the police, the Department of Corrections and various government agencies. And he won several cases : his jailers were forced to take off the heavy chains he had permanently tied to his legs. In another case won, the Department of Corrections was forced to take off these chains from all prisonners on death row.
On Tuesday 13th of July, a few months after having been released after having spent the last ten years in jail, Benny Moafi got chained again. But this time, he did it to himself : he locked the chain attached to his legs to the gate of Government House. The scene was astounding. When Mr Moafi arrived, dressed in a prisoner outfit, the intelligence agents of the government (mixed admist Thai journalists) and the police of the control post watched passively. They seem totally overwhelmed by the speed of the events and unable to understand what was going on.
Brandishing a sign board “Double Standards of Justice” and with “Guilty of Innocence” written on his back, Mr Moafi began distributing documents on his case and giving interviews to Thais and Foreign journalists. It was very hot, and Mr Moafi, after an hour, open the lock to chain himself again to the gate in the shade of a tree. The police again was unable to react.
The substance of the discourse of Mr Moafi is that he has been a victim of the Double Standards of the Thai Justice system. According to him, he was wrongly accused and sentenced because of the nexus of collusion linking some policemen, some prosecutors and some judges. And what he is asking for is a re-trial by the Appeal court so that his reputation is cleared and justice is done. And he wanted to deliver a letter to Prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva to explain his case. He was not able to deliver this letter to the Prime minister.
He considers his situation to be a small example of the issue of Double standards of Justice in Thailand, a topic emphasized by the recent Red shirts protest from March to May – protests who ended after a government ordered military crackdown. During the demonstrations, at least 90 people were killed according to the official figure : five military, two foreign journalists and 83 demonstrators.
So what will do Mr Moafi next ? In mid afternoon on that mid july tuesday, still sitting near the gate of Government House but without chains (the police had managed to cut them after a few hours of strenuous efforts), he said that he would bring his campaign to the United Nations. But Mr Moafi is a busy man. He has become an expert lawyer to help Foreign prisonners who are in difficult legal situations and his mobile phone is ringing every five minutes. With a wide smile and a spark in his eyes, he says “I have a job to do”.

No rule of law for Thai Police, However Hard You Try

Cette fois ci, j'étais bien décidé à tout faire pour avoir une contravention. Pas question de dire que je suis journaliste, ce qui, inévitablement entrainerait les policiers du poste de contrôle à me laisser partir sans sanction. Sur Rama IV, j'aperçois le barrage à environ 200 mètres, et, gêné par des voitures en stationnement illégal sur la voie de gauche, je m'engage, au guidon de ma Platinum 150 cc (nouveau carburateur et lumières de cylindre élargies), sur la voie du milieu. Tout va bien : un policier, masque anti-pollution sur le visage et vêtu de ces étonnants costumes caca d'oie cintrés qui leur moulent le thorax et les fesses, me fait signe de me ranger.
Je suis nerveux, je sais que cette fois ci il faudra aller plus loin que la fois précédente pour atteindre mon objectif, lequel n'est d'ailleurs pas très clair dans ma tête. Mes mains tremblent légèrement. "Permis !", me lance le policier. Je fais face et rétorque : "Nom, prénom, unité !". L'agent de l'Etat ne comprend pas. Il répéte "License, license", comme s'il me prenait pour un demeuré. Je lis son nom sur son badge que je saisis de la main. "Pas question de donner mon permis, agent Prasong Jampapeeng. Je veux connaître le nom de votre unité d'abord". Puis je dis, me dévoilant sans doute un peu trop tôt : "et je vous colle un procès au tribunal administratif". La notion de juridiction admnistrative semble planer très au dessus de l'agent Prasong, qui répéte : "ton permis !". De fureur, je jette mon casque dans la petite haie de troënne jaune vert qui borde Rama IV.
Il refuse de me donner le nom de son unité. Un officier vient à sa rescousse mais ne parvient pas à débloquer la situation. "Je ne donnerais pas mon permis tant que je n'aurais pas le nom de votre unité. J'en ai besoin pour vous intenter un procès", je persiste. Finalement, le second officier m'emméne voir son supérieur. Celui-ci, penché sur une table de camping établie sur le trottoir, note conscieusement sur un carnet les recettes de la journée. Avec le respect du à l'autorité, je lui dis : "Mr l'officier. Vos collègues m'ont arrêté car j'étais sur la voie du milieu. Mais je ne pouvais pas être sur la voie de gauche, car des voitures étaient en stationnement illégal". L'officier lance un regard perspicace. Il sent qu'il y a anguille sous roche. Il lâche tout de même : "la voie du milieu, c'est une infraction". Je triomphe. "Oui, je dis, c'est une infraction. Je suis parfaitement d'accord avec vous et je veux payer la contravention. Mais je veux le nom de votre unité, pour vous intenter un procès au tribunal administratif". Je me tourne vers l'agent Prasong : "De quoi as tu peur ? Pourquoi tu ne veux pas donner le nom de ton unité ? T'as honte ou quoi ?". Prasong est ngong. Dépassé. Ses capacités d'analyse saturées. Le processeur ne tourne pas assez vite.
L'officier supérieur calme le jeu. "Nous sommes de la police de la circulation, quartier central, Rama IV. Montrez votre permis". Je le montre et, comme je le craignais, il me dit : "c'est en régle, vous pouvez y aller". Cette fois je suis décidé à me battre pour avoir ma contravention. "Non, pas question. J'ai fait une infraction, vous devez me sanctionner. C'est votre devoir. Si la police ne fait pas son travail, que va-t-il advenir de la Nation ?". Je sens que l'affaire est perdue. L'officier commence à sourire. "Allez y. Je voulais juste contrôler votre permis. Tout est en règle". Je me bats avec l'énergie du désespoir. "Mr l'officier. S'il y a un gouvernement chemise rouge, tout le monde fera des infractions et, si la police ne fait pas son travail, ce sera la catastrophe. Le Premier ministre l'a dit : il faut suivre la loi. Strictement". C'est foutu. Mon jeu est définitivement dévoilé. Je suis le farang qui en sait trop. Je pars. L'agent Prasong est vexé, mais ne sait pas comment réagir. Je sers la main de l'officier, qui est maintenant très cordial. "Merci, je dis. C'était juste pour m'amuser".

Arnaud Dubus

Interview with Marwaan Macan-Markar, Thailand based correspondent for the IPS news agency and chairman of the FCCT

Question : There is a debate going on in Thailand about the coverage by the Foreign press of the political events. Parts of the Thai elite is accusing the Foreign press, especially the big international TV channels, of being “irresponsible” in their coverage and of being on the side of the Reds. What do you think of this debate ?


Maarwan Macan-Markar : First of all, what i find interesting is that they only focus on the Anglo-saxon medias. The two mains broadcast outlet that they have been critical of is CNN and the BBC. In a way, it tells us that there are the kind of medias that the Thai elite watches, where they get their news from : the english language medias like the BBC and CNN, and even some english language newspapers published in Britain : Times, The Economist and others....
When you talk about foreign medias coverage in Thailand, i think it is much more broader and much more complex than that. You are from France, there are German journalists, there are Japanese journalists, I am from Sri Lanka... So I think it is dangerous to assume that all foreign journalists follow a certain line. And it is not true.

Question : Do you think that this kind of issue is also in other countries. Yourself, you are from Sri Lanka. Did it happen in Sri Lanka that, at some points, the Foreign press was accused of being on the Tamil Tigers side or on the Cinghalese side ?

Maarwan Macan-Markar : It did happen in fact. I am familiar with this kind of criticisms levelled off by certain segments of a country towards international press coverage. And Sri Lanka certainly has seen a thread that has run the course of a 25 years conflict. It came to a head last year during the final month of the government troops on the Tamil Tigers, so much so that a lot of international medias were accused of being pro-LTTE. I, myself, when I was in Sri Lanka, wrote for a newspaper called The Sunday Leader, which has been a strong voice of dissent and disagreement.
My former boss was killed last year just outside the newspaper office. So, Sri Lankan journalists have paid a heavy price for offering an alternative narrative to the government narrative.
What you see in Thailand is much more interesting. In other words, very few Thai journalists have been accused of being voices of dissent. It seems like the government is targetting the international media and how the international medias reported the anti-government Red shirts demonstrations in Thailand.

Question : There seems to be anger and bitterness from parts of the Thai upper class vis à vis the Foreign medias. Where do you think this feeling is coming from ?


Marwaan Macan-Markar : I think, partly, it is just the problem in Thai reportage. This recent phase of the Red shirts demonstrations started gathering momentum in January this year, when there were a lot of activities happening in the North-Eastern part of Thailand, which is the heartland of the Red shirts. I, myself, made many visits to the North East since February chronicling the growing momentum of Red shirts political sentiment, following some of their meetings, doing a story on the opening of Red shirts schools.
So when it all came to a head in March when tenths of thousands of Red shirts protesters arrived in a caravan of Red to Bangkok, which was an historic occasion, I was not surprised by this. What happened is the Thai medias refused to cover the story. The Thai medias were more interested in the Bangkok view, the metropolitan view of things. There was very little coverage by Thai medias of reporters going to the provinces to understand why people are angry. I think the basic job of a journalist is to demonstrate a level of curiosity.
And if you hear that a segment of your country is expressing some anger and resentment, it is only important that you go to those places and try to understand the anger. You do not have to take sides. Understand and explain the anger. And that is what a number of Foreign journalists have been doing.
So we had followed the story coming up to March. And then, of course, since it was all in Bangkok from March to mid-May, we had a better understanding of what happened. So partly, the anger stems probably from being shocked at what was happening in their country. That was the elite's reaction.
Now, had they been exposed to the realities happening in the provinces, I think the anger would not have been as stark as what we are seing right now.


Question : Do you think that among the Thai medias, there is a problem of self-censorship and a problem of censorship by the management ?


Maarwan Macan-Markar : Well, I am aware that the broadcasting channels were under some pressure to toe the government line. In fact, some of the mainstream Thai TV stations, not the cable channels, admitted so. The print medias is very free in this country. I think it is very free, very vibrant. Thais can be very proud of the space for freedom of expression and it is reflected in the print medias.
But if that is the case, the question need to be asked of why one did not see the kind of vibrant coverage, critical coverage that one woud expect at such time. For instance, Thai Rath, which is the largest circulation Thai language newspaper, was very progressive, very informative, was doing a lot of stories that cut accross the Thai political spectrum, from articles that were sympathetic to the Red shirts to those that were sympathetic to the government.
There were other newspapers less so. But the general impression created in this country, leading up to this, is that there was a level of self censorship, there was a level of disguise them (i.e. demonstratrors) as nuisances or disguise as trouble makers or sometimes dismissing them as buffaloes and stupid, which is very derogatory. I think that metropolitan biases did come out.

Question : The english language daily The Nation had played a very important role in May 1992, because, when the Bangkok Post was self censoring itself, The Nation stood firm and reported the news and played an important role against the pro-military government of general Suchinda Kraprayoon. Then, after 1992, a new TV channel, ITV, was created because there was an awareness that there was a problem with the coverage by the Thai TV channels which were reporting too much the government line. Now The Nation is completely one-sided. It is tied by its ownership. And Thai PBS channel, the former ITV, is not doing a very balanced reporting. How can we explain this change from progressive standing in 1992 to conservative standing in 2010 ?

Marwaan Macan-Markar : I think it is a bit more complex than that. The Thai medias who are critical of the Red shirts and not critical enough of the government also reflects a certain animosity towards Mr Thaksin Shinawatra, the former Prime minister. The Nation openly admits that they suffered a lot during the five-and-a-half years term of Mr Thaksin. They felt they were persecuted. And I think the anger that emerged at the time, the hostility towards Mr Thaksin in a way shapes their coverage. Because they feel that the Red shirts are pro-Thaksin supporters and therefore they don't want to give any leeway for Mr Thaksin to come back.
About Thai PBS, it is interesting that the Red shirts demonstrators i spoke to, during the protests, gave the impression that, of the Thai broadcast medias, the one that was most fair to them was Thai PBS. At least, this channel gives their voice, their stories.
But i think, if we look at whatever bias there is in the Thai media coverage, most of it is shaped by this hostility towards Mr Thaksin, because he was no friend of free expression, he was no friend of Thailand independent press ; he applied a lot of pressure and crackdown and crushed some of these independent voices. And that resentment still bubbles under the surface. And i think that shaped the way in which the news agenda was set in covering the recent protests.