Benedict Anderson : "The lèse-majesté laws increase in harshness as the monarchy is afraid"

On 7th of June, Bangkok-based free-lance journalist Lisa Gardner organized a symposium to discuss the issue of the lèse-majesté law in Thailand. Journalists Pravit Rojanapreuk of The Nation and Andrew McGregor Marshall, who famously resigned his position at Reuters to publish the Wikileaks telegrams concerning the Thai monarchy, as well as the political scientist Benedict Anderson and the Thai writer Sulak Sivaraksa, participated to this panel called “Rhetoric and Dissent”. Following is the complete contribution of Benedict Anderson.

Photo : Benedict Anderson at the symposium "Rhetoric and Dissent" (c) Yan Martel

The “solid monarchies”, the ones we are likely to see around for 40, 50 years, all do have lèse-majesté laws, but these laws are more or less not in use at all. You can find jokes in British medias on the royal family, some not very friendly, but the institution is strong enough that people who wants to laugh laugh, and that is it. It is striking that the lèse-majesté laws increase in harshness as the monarchy is afraid. It is striking that in Europe, the country with the harshest lèse-majesté law is Spain, and the reason is that there is a huge scandal going on now which has reached the point where many journalists have said that it is time that the king abdicates. Abdication is the best way for the monarchy to stay if it has undesirable member. In the present crisis, the Spanish royal family does not dare to put people in jail for lèse-majesté, because the scandals that have opened are out of the control even of Spain.

The king is notorious for a long time to go on very long vacations, very expensive, at the expense of tax payers with no information of where the vacations were and who went with him. It is not a good idea, when Spain has a 50 % unemployment rate among young people and 23 % among adults. The last time, it comes out that he went to shoot elephants in Southern Africa and there are two striking things about it. First, he made his mark, before, by becoming the honorary president of World Wildlife Fund. Then it turned out that the vacations was paid by a Syrian billionaire, a right hand man for high Saudi Arabian ministers. The reason is that the King interfered to make sure that the Spanish corporations would be the ones to build a top speed railway between Saudi airports and Mecca and Medina. And of course, there has been for a long time plenty of gossip about his sexual behavior which has alienated him deeply from his wife. This is a monarchy which has a lot to hide and has been hiding it quite successfully for a long time. But it is now not more possible to hide it, because there are too many medias and sources all over the world who want to know.

This is an example that, when lèse-majesté laws are built, typically it is because the persons behind them have things that he or she or they “klua” (in Thai : “afraid of”). And the defense for that is increasing the lèse-majesté law. This is not just the case in Spain, you can find it in other places as well. You can take that as a sign not so much that Satan is doing better, but the opposite, that God is not doing so well.

Another thing is that monarchies these days in every country are the last. If the dynasty, the family dies out, there will be no new dynasty. All monarchies are aware of this. In most cases, that actually encourages them to do better than they used to. Because after this, it is going to be a Republic in some form or another.
One of the reasons, the source for a kind of warrior (i.e. ultra-royalist, ndlr), is something quite simple, it has nothing to do with monarchy, you can see it elsewhere. If you look at Bangkok Post statistics on the number of Thai men who were wearing yellow robes as monks or novices ten years ago, the number was still six millions Thais. But last year it dropped to 1.5 million. It is a colossal change. In ten years, the active Buddhist monks lost 70 % of what they had before. And it is not because of a plot, but because a very rapidly changing urbanization, of new forms of consumerism... It means that the space for holiness is quite seriously damaged. And in so far as the monarchy, traditionally, has some kind of religious aura around it, it is something we have to keep an eye on.

Six years ago. I was coming from the South on the eve of the elections. Going through Chumphon, Petchaburi, etc… I was looking for the billboards for Prachathipat (Democrat party). To my astonishment, I could not find any for three or four hours. 30 % was advertisements for monks, amulets and pagodas and 70 % was a kind of elections campaign, like somebody was running for re-election. This is a big contrast with the situation 30 years ago. It is the reverse side of all this anxiety : an enormous campaign, by bureaucrats, to drown the visible roads, shops, with endlessly repeated pictures of the royal family. You will find it hard to see anywhere in the world a place where so much energy is put into this kind of message, a sign of this kind of massive saturation of public space… We don’t need to have this in England, or in Sweden or Monaco, because it is too much. You have to know in this kind of situation how to react sensibly.

One anecdocte when I was a student at Cambridge university. After any movie, there was a shot on the screen of Queen Elizabeth on horseback. If you was crying after the movie or if you were inspired, you could not bear it. We would rush out of the cinema. Elderly people were furious and yelled at us. Ten years after, they move the short sequence about the queen before the beginning of the movie. Next to the advertisements for chocolates and pop corns. It was more easy, you just had to wait in the lobby. It was a more tactful way. Ten years after that, the palace gave up. It is all beneficial because we were really irritated by it. We need more flexibility and more understanding of what Thai society today is like and aspires to.

Chronique siamoise : Lady Gaga jette un pavé dans la Chao Phraya

La chanteuse américaine, en tournée en Asie, a choqué de nombreux Thaïlandais en parlant des fausses montres vendues à Bangkok.

La saga Lady Gaga va-t-elle rendre les Thaïs gogo ? Ou faut-il se gausser tout de go des dégâts provoqués par Lady Gaga ? La réponse à cette question demande à ce que l’on se penche sur le rapport des Thaïs à l’image extérieure de leur pays. Car ce qui a choqué en Thaïlande ne sont pas, comme en Corée du Sud, aux Philippines ou en Indonésie, les tenues ultra-sexy de la méga-star, mais le fait qu’elle ait annoncé, sur son compte twitter, qu’elle allait acheter une fausse Rolex, puis qu’elle ait visité un cabaret de spectacles transgenres lors de sa première soirée bangkokienne. Que les fausses montres et les transgenres abondent à Bangkok relève de l’évidence. Que les spectacles de cabaret et les concours de beauté transgenres fascinent les Thaïs (et bien sûr les étrangers de passage) est bien connu. Les médias thaïlandais consacrent régulièrement de longs articles à ces phénomènes économiques, culturels et sociaux. La littérature universitaire sur la transsexualité et l’homosexualité en Thaïlande est d’une richesse étonnante. Ce n’est donc pas la réalité de ce qu’a mis en relief Lady Gaga – l’ambiguïté sexuelle et intellectuelle - qui est en cause, ni même le fait que cette réalité soit largement exposée. Mais le fait qu’à cause de la renommée mondiale de la chanteuse et des 25 millions d’abonnés à son compte twitter, cette exposition ait eu immédiatement un retentissement mondial.

La firme britannique de dictionnaires Longman s’était heurtée au même écueil en 1993 quand elle avait défini dans son dictionnaire de la langue et de la culture anglaises le mot Bangkok comme suit : «Ville réputée pour ses pagodes bouddhistes et où il y a beaucoup de prostituées». Tous les exemplaires du dictionnaire impie avaient été immédiatement retirés des librairies du royaume et le gouvernement avait menacé d’interdire l’ensemble des publications de la firme.

En Thaïlande, la valeur de la vérité est souvent relative à sa coloration négative ou positive. Une vérité qui renforce une image positive est une vérité bonne à propager. Une vérité qui met le doigt sur certaines faiblesses est à proscrire. Une vérité n’est pas «bonne» en soi, en tant que calque fidèle de la réalité. Il y a une certaine sagesse dans cette attitude qui évite de mettre sur un piédestal une perspective sur la réalité qui n’en est qu’une parmi une infinité d’autres possibles. Comme l’authenticité des montres et l’identité sexuelle, la vérité est un concept à géométrie variable selon les circonstances. Bien sûr, cette discrimination existe partout : qui apprécie qu’on lui jette ses «quatre vérités» à la figure ? Mais le phénomène de remise en question, l’effort pour corriger ses fautes, lié à l’éthique chrétienne, n’est pas enraciné dans un environnement culturel bouddhiste où, stricto sensu, il n’est pas possible de se réformer au cours de l’existence présente.

Cette obsession de l’apparence se fonde aussi sur l’importance de la face. Celle-ci n’est pas une projection de la personnalité intérieure, qui reste dans le domaine privé, mais une sorte de masque plaisant dont l’objectif est de préserver l’harmonie de l’ensemble social. Par ses commentaires et son attitude, Lady Gaga a troublé cette surface paisible. En quelques mots, elle a condensé sa vision – la vision d’une star internationale et donc, pour les Thaïs, représentative de celle de l’Occident – de la Thaïlande : «le pays des fausses Rolex et des transsexuels». Le paradoxe est que la séduction qu’exerce Lady Gaga sur ses fans, lesquels sont très nombreux en Thaïlande, vient de ce mélange savamment dosé de provocation, de brutale sincérité et d’irrespect des formes – en somme d’une certaine fraîcheur. Lady Gaga n’est sûrement pas reap roy (convenable, d’une conduite appropriée), mais elle est sans conteste sanouk (délurée), voire ding-dong (fofolle).

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Chronique siamoise : l'insoutenable légèreté de la non-responsabilité

En Thaïlande, l’art de l’esquive prévaut sur la reconnaissance de ses fautes, laquelle risquerait d’entrainer une perte de face difficile à digérer

A la question d’un journaliste lui demandant s’il se sentait responsable des morts lors des manifestations anti-gouvernementales d’avril-mai 2010, l’ancien Premier ministre Abhisit Vejjajiva répondit : «Nous sommes tous un petit peu responsables». Habile répartie qui a permis au politicien diplômé d’Oxford de se sortir d’une situation potentiellement embarrassante. En Thaï, le mot «responsabilité» se traduit littéralement par quelque chose comme «accepter le mal avec le bien qui va avec». Souvent, après une crise ou un incident, les personnes affectées diront qu’il «faut que quelqu’un accepte de prendre la responsabilité». Le problème est que dans le pays du matin bruyant, les candidats ne se bousculent pas au portillon de la perte de face.

Chaque culture a sa propre façon de confronter cet inconfort. Les ministres ou les PDG japonais semblent presque jouir intérieurement dans l’humiliation publique, dans l’acceptation totale de la faute y compris si c’est celle des autres, une sorte de culte de l’autosacrifice bien dans les mœurs de cette nation adulant la discipline. Aux Etats-Unis, le système judiciaire fera plus ou moins le travail : les vautours des banques d’investissement et les escrocs de haut vol savent bien qu’ils ne pourront pas échapper éternellement au bras armé du glaive. La Thaïlande, elle, a privilégié l’opportunisme par rapport à l’héroïsme. L’important est de «s’en tirer» ou de «sauver sa peau» : ao tua rot. Avez-vous entendu parler dans les quarante dernières années d’un ministre thaïlandais proposant sa démission après avoir été impliqué dans un scandale de corruption ? La phrase sibylline «le conducteur a fui la scène de l’accident» que l’on trouve à la fin de presque tous les articles narrant de graves accidents de circulation peut être transposée à tous les niveaux de la société. Qu’un incident survienne, et chacun se hâtera d’assurer qu’il «n’était pas là» (mai ju) ou «qu’il ne sait pas» (mai ru). La reconnaissance et la pleine acceptation de la faute prendra une forme amollie ; elle se perdra dans les brumes de l’être collectif : «un autre», «eux», «nous».

Cette faculté d’esquiver les coups a son penchant positif : la compassion. Telle Chemise rouge qui risque sa vie en mai 2010 pour sauver un journaliste touché de plusieurs balles, tel résident d’un bidonville se faisant à moitié brûlé pour protéger une famille lors de l’incendie qui ravage son quartier… des exemples qui montrent qu’il existe aussi une conception individuelle du devoir moral, mais celle-ci semble curieusement plus vivace parmi les gens de condition modeste que dans les cercles du pouvoir politique et économique. Ce qui pourrait s’expliquer par le fait que la compassion au sens bouddhique suppose que l’on n’ait pas eu sa part dans la création du problème et que l’on n’agit pas dans le but de bénéficier soi-même de son geste.

Cela nous ramène au discours prononcé par l’ancien Premier ministre Thaksin Shinawatra le 19 mai, lors de la commémoration de la répression de 2010, dans lequel il a demandé aux dizaines de milliers de Chemises rouges présentes d’oublier ce qui s’était passé il y a deux ans et de renoncer à la justice en faveur de paix et de la réconciliation. Visiblement empreint d’une intense compassion envers sa propre personne, Thaksin n’a pas eu l’élégance d’évoquer sa «petite part de responsabilité» pour avoir poussé les Chemises rouges à la provocation puis les avoir abandonnées à leur destin sanglant.

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Chronique siamoise : mille poids, mille mesures

Comme dans tous les tribunaux du monde, le symbole de la balance de justice figure de manière éminente dans les tribunaux de Thaïlande. Généralement, cette balance est représentée sur le bureau derrière lequel les juges officient. Elle n’est toutefois pas tenue par la traditionnelle déesse aux yeux bandés - un aveuglement qui doit garantir l’impartialité des jugements. En revanche, bien au-dessus de la balance de justice, figure le portrait du roi actuel Bhumibol Adulyadej. Les deux plateaux de la balance de justice thaïlandaise sont-ils équilibrés ? La réponse est délicate, mais l’étude de deux cas précis peut aider la réflexion.

Dans le premier cas, l’avocat Somchai Neelapaijit disparaît en mars 2004, quelques jours après avoir accusé la police thaïlandaise d’avoir torturé plusieurs de ses clients, suspects d’actes de violence dans le sud à majorité musulmane. Son corps n’a jamais été retrouvé, mais des témoignages et les circonstances de sa disparition à Bangkok mènent les enquêteurs sur la piste de cinq policiers. Ceux-ci plaident non coupables, mais il s’avère que ces policiers ont échangé entre eux plusieurs dizaines de coups de téléphone le jour de l’enlèvement dans le quartier où les faits ont eu lieu et qu’ils ont à plusieurs reprises contacté Somchai. Des témoins reconnaissent formellement l’un des policiers comme un membre du groupe de cinq personnes ayant poussé Somchai de force dans sa voiture au moment de l’enlèvement.

Durant le procès, qui s’étale sur plusieurs années, la charge de la preuve conformément au droit thaïlandais pèse sur les accusateurs. Plusieurs témoins sont victimes d’intimidation. Les juges estiment que les relevés d’appels de téléphones portables ne peuvent pas servir de preuves. Quatre des policiers sont relaxés pour «manque de preuves» et un cinquième est condamné à trois années de prison. Libéré sous caution après avoir interjeté appel, il disparaît à jamais.

Dans le second cas, Ampol Tangnoppakul, un retraité âgé de 61 ans, est accusé d’avoir envoyé en mai 2010 quatre texto insultant envers la famille royale au secrétaire du Premier ministre de l’époque Abhisit Vejjajiva. Ampol plaide non coupable. Au cours du procès, la charge de la preuve est inexplicablement renversée : il appartient désormais à l’accusé de prouver qu’il n’a pas envoyé les texto et qu’il n’était pas en possession de son téléphone au moment des faits. La seule preuve de l’accusation s’appuie sur le numéro de téléphone portable d’où sont venus les texto, revenant sur la jurisprudence établie dans l’affaire Somchai. La question de savoir comment cet ancien chauffeur routier pouvait être en possession du numéro de téléphone portable du secrétaire du Premier ministre ne semble pas germer dans la tête des juges. Ampol, surnommé Oncle SMS par les médias, est condamné à 20 ans de prison. Il interjette appel. A huit reprises, sa demande de libération sous caution pour raisons de santé est rejetée. Il meurt d’un cancer du foie, le 8 mai dernier, à l’hôpital de la prison.

Peut-on conclure qu’il y a, dans le système judiciaire thaïlandais, deux poids deux mesures ? De manière plus réaliste, on pourrait hasarder que la définition de la « justice » est variable au gré des circonstances, de la position sociale des accusés et des accusateurs (leur «face»), du type de cas, des conséquences possibles de tel ou tel jugement. Les juges n’ont pas l’impression de délivrer une justice partiale, mais la « meilleure justice » adaptée à la situation. L’idée d’une justice inamovible, monolithique et imperturbable semble trop irréelle pour cadrer avec l’éthos pragmatique de nombreux Thaïlandais.

Max Constant (http://asie-info.fr)

Chronique siamoise : du rififi au parlement thaïlandais

La première réunion d’un Parlement thaïlandais s’est déroulée au début de 1933 sous les dômes de style baroque de la salle du trône Ananta Samakhom, que le roi Rama V avait fait construire initialement pour célébrer la gloire de la monarchie absolue. En 1974, il a été décidé qu’un Palais était trop luxueux pour les représentants du peuple : députés et sénateurs ont été déménagés dans des immeubles au design vaguement postmoderniste à quelques centaines de mètres de là. Il est maintenant question de les expédier dans une banlieue éloignée. Entre ces deux dates, dix-sept constitutions se sont succédées les unes aux autres. La sacralité de la charte fondamentale et l’opinion des Thaïlandais vis-à-vis de leurs représentants ont dégringolé en proportion.

Chaque Parlement a ses excentricités. La drague des attachées parlementaires est un sport bien connu au Palais Bourbon. Les échanges de coups au sein du Parlement de Taiwan sont légendaires. Les députés (et ministres) thaïlandais ont toutefois produit des efforts considérables pour remonter en haut du listing des chambres de mauvaise réputation. Que le vice-Premier ministre Chalerm Yoobamrung, apparemment ivre, ait failli dégringoler les pas des escaliers de la chambre basse vient peut-être, comme il l’a affirmé, d’un problème de «déséquilibre dans les tympans auditifs». Qu’un député du Parti démocrate regarde des images érotiques sur son téléphone portable pendant les débats pourrait résulter de ce qu’il a reçu, à sa grande surprise, ces images d’un ami égrillard. Mais quand il est montré que des députés votent à la place de collègues en leur absence, on commence à avoir des doutes. Ceux-ci deviennent aigus en entendant un autre député crier à trois reprises «Heil Hitler !» en faisant le salut nazi au milieu d’une séance parlementaire. Sans doute, ce député avait-il été échaudé par le fait que le président de la chambre avait coupé son micro. Mais le parlementaire avait tout loisir de piocher dans le registre particulièrement riche et merveilleusement imagé des jurons thaïlandais (un exemple parmi d’autres : «Espèce de pénis décalotté rongé par les écureuils», qu’il est conseillé de tester auprès des gardes de sécurité du métro aérien de Bangkok).

La médiocrité de la classe politique thaïlandaise tient en partie à la primauté absolue des clans liés à un chef personnel sur les familles d’idées. Même si, ailleurs, les «principes» sont souvent un camouflage des intérêts bien compris, ils contribuent néanmoins à «élever le débat» intellectuellement. Mais en Thaïlande, les «idées» ou les théories n’ont guère droit de cité si elles n’aboutissent pas très vite et très concrètement à un résultat pratique.

L’expression thaïe len kan muang – jouer à la politique – pour désigner les activités politiques semble associer la vie démocratique à un soap opera où tout est pardonnable parce que personne ne le prend au sérieux. Sauf, bien sûr, les politiciens qui empochent les dividendes de ce casino national. Au final, les élections parlementaires semblent avant tout être une procédure formelle inévitable pour la prise du pouvoir par le chef d’un clan dominant. Ce qui se passe après au sein du Parlement n’est plus que divertissement télévisuel. Même la compétition pour l’acquisition des budgets provinciaux se déroule bien plus en coulisses que sur la scène. Ni Thaksin Shinawatra, quand il était Premier ministre, ni sa sœur cadette Yingluck , qui l’est actuellement, n’ont jugé d’ailleurs utile de donner le change en assistant régulièrement aux débats de la chambre basse, dont les pupitres sont le plus souvent désertés par ses honorables membres.

Max Constant (copyright : http://asie-info.fr)

Chronique siamoise : théâtre masqué à Bangkok

Le Ramakien, version siamoise du Ramayana indien, est un ballet codifié où costumes et gestuelle suivent des règles strictes et immuables. Chaque élément du costume a une signification. Chaque posture exprime une attitude. Point n’est besoin de paroles, même si les déclamations du prince Rama ou de Tosakhan, le roi des démons, emplissent la salle du théâtre Chalermkrung. La chorégraphie soutenue par la musique traditionnelle d’un orchestre de cinq instruments, dont le ranad, série de planchettes reliées entre elles et que l’on frappe à l’aide de deux baguettes, suffit, d’autant que l’audience connait à peu près l’intrigue d’avance (les scènes représentées sont expliquées dans le programme).

Le ballet auquel ont participé le président du Conseil privé du roi, Prem Tinsulanonda, et la cheffe du gouvernement Yingluck Shinawatra entourée de ministres choisis a, de la même façon, suivi un script préparé à l’avance : on n’entre pas sur scène pour improviser. Les couleurs d’abord. Le rose pour l’équipe gouvernementale, avec Yingluck vêtue d’un élégant tailleur rose pastel. Les vice-Premier ministres Yongyuth Wichaidit et Kittirat na Ranong, eux aussi arborent cette couleur bénigne, mais dans un ton un peu plus vif. Quant au ministre de la Défense Yutthasak Sasiphrapa qui avait dû perdre le programme, il s’est avancé en uniforme blanc. Le rose est une des couleurs associées avec le roi Bhumibol Adulyadej. Du côté du général Prem, une « chemise Prem » en soie d’un orange un peu criard : l’orange est la couleur du jeudi selon le calendrier astrologique thaï, jour où a eu lieu la rencontre. Si la rencontre avait eu lieu un dimanche ou un lundi, rouge et jaune auraient été de rigueur. Ce qui aurait fait désordre.

La gestuelle ensuite. Yingluck, redevenue la sage étudiante de Chiang Mai, mains respectueusement jointes à hauteur de la taille, paumes vers le haut, courbée légèrement vers l’avant comme une dévote devant la Vierge. Le regard est fixé sur l’hôte, empreint de soumission. Le général nonagénaire dans son costume fruité pavoise sur le seuil, le buste droit. Il dispense ses oracles et ses conseils. Son regard ne porte pas sur ses interlocuteurs mais se perd au loin, fixé, sans doute, sur l’avenir de la Nation, la grandeur de la Monarchie. Le wai de Yingluck est une splendeur, laquelle résulte d’une longue habitude des bienséances ; il fait montre d’une maîtrise corporelle parfaite.

Par contraste, cet épisode en rappelle un autre de l’interminable épopée qu’est la lutte pour le pouvoir politique en Thaïlande. C’était un peu avant l’inauguration du pont Rama VIII enjambant le fleuve Chao Phraya en mai 2002. Le roi Bhumibol visitait pour la première fois le pont accompagné du Premier ministre de l’époque Thaksin Shinawatra et de Samak Sundaravej, alors gouverneur de Bangkok. Au milieu du pont, le monarque, en costume de ville, s’adressait au gouverneur de Bangkok, héritier d’une vieille famille noble, et à ses adjoints. Derrière cette haie d’uniformes blanc, Thaksin, alors au pouvoir depuis un an et quelques mois, se haussait sur la pointe des pieds avec un sourire crispé pour être aperçu du souverain. L’image, là encore, était parlante, le commentaire superflu. Peut-on imaginer Tosakhan-Thaksin, s’humilier devant le vieil ermite Prem ? Rien n’est absolument exclu, mais le risque serait peut-être que les spectateurs perdent le fil du scénario.

Max Constant (copyright : http://asie-info.fr)

Chronique siamoise : unité, solidarité ou uniformité

Pour justifier sa décision début avril d’interdire la projection du film « Shakespeare doit mourir » d’Ing Kanjanavanit en Thaïlande, le bureau thaïlandais de la censure a estimé que la diffusion de cette œuvre, un remake de MacBeth à la sauce siamoise, accroitrait les divisions entre Thaïlandais et saperait l’unité du pays. Cette notion d’unité a été maintes fois invoquée par les autorités depuis le coup d’Etat de septembre 2006, et même avant, pour expliquer la nécessité de mesures répressives contre la liberté d’expression. Ce concept d’unité s’exprime par le mot sammaki, dont une traduction plus exacte est « solidarité » ; il est présenté comme une donnée évidente et intangible du pays.

Pourtant quand on se tourne vers l’histoire, cette notion d’unité paraît absente. Regardez le film « Suriyothai » de M. C. Chatrichalerm et vous y verrez, six heures durant, des princes et des courtisanes des principautés du Siam s’entredéchirer dans des luttes sanglantes, se repaître d’assassinats vicieux et porter la trahison au sommet du génie politique. L’une des scènes les plus frappantes est celle d’un prince-enfant, enfoui dans un sac de velours rouge, dont la tête est cérémonieusement tranchée sur les ordres d’un de ses oncles. La vingtaine de coup d’Etats qui ont ponctué l’histoire de la Thaïlande depuis le renversement de la monarchie absolue en 1932 suggère aussi une fracturation extrême du paysage politique. Et si l’on se penche sur l’aspect social du pays, il est clair que le développement économique depuis les années 1970 a été beaucoup moins bien réparti qu’en Corée du Sud ou à Taiwan ; les classes moyennes urbaines ont grandement bénéficié, les ruraux des provinces ont stagné.

S’il est un ferment d’unité, c’est sans conteste la personne du roi Bhumibol Adulyadej. Le monarque est un lien entre toutes les classes, toutes les ethnies, le miroir qui reflète l’image de tout un chacun et rassure : « nous sommes donc bien solidaires ». D’où l’angoisse de l’après-Rama IX : que restera-t-il comme ciment de la nation ? La Thainess signifie différentes choses selon les milieux. Le consumérisme effréné, le culte de l’argent, le commercialisme envahissant qui dissout les vieilles valeurs communautaires ne peuvent servir de piliers à la nation. Et cette notion d’unité agitée par les autorités et l’establishment ne fait-elle pas plutôt référence à l’uniformité ? Les divisions dénoncées comme le mal menaçant ne sont-elles pas simplement la diversité de cultures, d’opinions et d’idées qui remuent la société thaïe ? Des esprits chagrins iront jusqu’à affirmer que ce repli constant sur une unité insaisissable est une manière d’imposer un « consensus », tolérable pour la majorité mais qui profite surtout à une minorité. Les idées, incontestablement, divisent la société, mais elles constituent aussi les matériaux qui servent à l’édification de valeurs communes.

Max Constant(copyright http://asie-info.fr)

Les bonzes Occidentaux en Thaïlande

Voici un lien sur un Grand reportage : "Ces Occidentaux qui deviennent bonzes en Thaïlande" (durée 20 mn).

http://www.rfi.fr/emission/20120510-ces-occidentaux-deviennent-bonzes-thailande

Photo : Phra Kitthivetho, dans la pagode Wat Pho Thong, à Thonburi (photo par Arnaud Dubus)

Nouvelle donne politique en Birmanie

Pour sentir le vent de changement qui souffle sur la Birmanie, un coup d'oeil sur les étalages de vendeurs de journaux à même les trottoirs maculés de jus de bétel de Rangoon suffit. A la une des quotidiens et hebdomadaires en langue birmane, s'étalent des photos de Min Ko Naing, l'un des plus célèbres dissidents politiques du pays porté en triomphe sur les épaules de ses admirateurs le jour de sa libération le 13 janvier. D'autres affichent l'ex-Premier ministre Khin Nyunt, purgé en 2004 et lui aussi libéré à la mi-janvier, relâchant une colombe avec un large sourire. A côté, un calendrier 2012 présente une photo géante d'Aung San Suu Kyi, la principale figure du mouvement pro-démocratique. Même les matches du championnat anglais de football, dont les Birmans sont pourtant si friands, ont été éclipsés par la vague du renouveau politique. Il y a seulement six mois, la stricte censure auraient rendu impossible un tel traitement par la presse. Et puis, il y un je ne sais quoi dans l'air lumineux de la ville qui laisse percevoir qu'un glissement s'est produit : des visages plus souriants, des passants plus détendus, des entretiens organisés dans des lobbys d'hôtels qui auraient provoqué, autrefois, la fureur des services de renseignement et une grande frayeur chez l'interlocuteur birman. “Les gens sont plus "relax" depuis que nous ne sommes plus sous un gouvernement militaire. Avant, personne n'osait réagir quand un sergent ivre harcelait les villageois. Cela aussi a changé”, raconte une artiste.

Certes, il convient de ne pas céder à une quelconque euphorie : cinquante ans de dictature militaire ne s'efface pas d'un trait de plume. Un politicien d'opposition explique comment, au parlement, les députés hésitent à s'exprimer ouvertement, tant ils sont conditionnés par des habitudes de réserve. “Les gens n'ont pas encore de culture démocratique. Ils ne savent pas ce que sont les droits de l'Homme, les droit des citoyens. Si nous voulons développer notre pays, nous devons, avant tout, éduquer les gens en ce qui concerne les valeurs démocratiques”, explique Kaing Cho Moe, un ex-prisonnier politique libéré l'an dernier et originaire de l'Etat Rakhine, près de la frontière avec le Bangladesh.

Le paysage politique est en voie de transformation. L'éternel face à face entre la Ligue nationale pour la Démocratie, le parti d'Aung San Suu Kyi, et les généraux est une image du passé. D'autres partis politiques d'opposition ont émergé et tentent de s'affirmer, même s'ils ne disposent que d'un faible nombre de sièges au parlement. Le rôle de “leader du mouvement pro-démocratique” d'Aung San Suu Kyi est contesté par certains. “Nous avons essayé de nous entendre avec la Ligue nationale pour la Démocratie, mais ils ne veulent pas nous reconnaître. Ils pensent qu'ils constituent à eux seuls les forces démocratiques”, estime Than Nyein, président du Front national démocratique, un parti né d'une scission au sein de la Ligue, laquelle avait boycotté les élections de 2010. Aung San Suu Kyi, qui porte ses 66 ans avec une grâce étonnante, va se présenter lors des élections partielles du 1er avril lors desquelles 48 sièges de la chambre basse seront mis en jeu. A ceux qui lui conseillent de ne pas se salir les mains avec la basse politique mais d'assumer plutôt une position de “Statewoman”, une sorte d'autorité morale, elle rétorque que personne ne doit faire exception au processus électoral. “Je pense que c'est une attitude très dangereuse de penser qu'un politicien quelqu'il soit est dans une position trop élevée pour être impliqué dans des activités parlementaires de base. Si vous croyez dans la démocratie représentative, vous devez travailler au travers du parlement”, dit-elle.

Du côté des autorités, le schéma simpliste d'un bloc monolithique ne tient plus. Le président du gouvernement civil Thein Sein, dont tout le monde semble reconnaître la probité, acquiert un début de popularité bien qu'il soit un ancien général et qu'il ait été placé à son poste par l'ancien chef de la junte Than Shwe. Devant la prison d'Insein, lorsque des dizaines de prisonniers politiques étaient libérés à la mi-janvier, certains militants pro-démocratiques criaient “longue vie au président Thein Sein !”. “Il pensait à ce programme de réforme depuis longtemps, mais il devait attendre le moment opportun. Quand l'opportunité s'est présentée, il était prêt”, indique Khin Zaw Win, un analyste politique. La position de Thein Sein restait fragile jusqu'au début de l'été : les réformes affectent de nombreux officiers militaires tenants de la ligne dure ou proche des Chinois. A la mi-janvier dernier, un remaniement au sein des commandements militaires et un long voyage en Thaïlande du chef d'Etat-major laissent à penser qu'une tentative de coup d'Etat aurait été éventée. Mais chaque jour qui passe renforce le pouvoir du gouvernement civil et les visites de dignitaires étrangers qui se succèdent – les chefs de la diplomatie Hillary Clinton, William Hague et Alain Juppé et bientôt la chef de la diplomatie de l'union européenne Catherine Ashton – montrent que l'ouverture semble produire le résultat escompté : le rapprochement avec les pays occidentaux. A terme, le processus démocratique est sans doute irréversible. “Le point d'équilibre a été franchi”, dit Khin Zaw Win. Mais les retours provisoires en arrière, les blocages, ne sont pas à exclure. Thein Sein, atteint d'une maladie cardiaque, porte un pace-maker. “Le destin du pays dépend d'une petite boîte dans la poîtrine du président”, dit une analyste politique australienne à Rangoon.

Arnaud Dubus

Copyright Le Temps SA

LM trials in Thailand are reminiscent of Moscow show trials

In the years 1936, 1937 and 1938, a number of Lenin’s companions – Kamenev, Zinoviev, Toukhatchevski, Boukharine and others - were tried before courts under control of the totalitarian state being established by Stalin. They were accused of having betrayed the cause of Socialism ; History remembers these events, which led to harsh prison sentences in detention camps for all the accused, as the “Moscow trials”. Some features of these twisted judicial processes are strikingly similar to the LM trials which have taken place recently in Thailand. The aim here is not to say that the LM trials in Thailand are remakes of the Moscow trials – of course, they are not -, but rather to emphasize a few aspects which seem alike, in order to be able to get an idea of the mindset behind judicial processes intending to create fear in a given society.

One feature of the Moscow trial – in which all the evidences were fabricated and all the witnesses were fake witnesses – was the quality of the accusation. Even the slightest deviation from the orthodoxy, in this case Stalin’s version of socialism, was considered a betrayal of the cause. Fervent communists who had opposed Stalin on some aspects of the policies, like the collectivization of agriculture, were branded traitors and castigated as enemies. There was no middle way, no possible criticism in the public interest or for the good of the cause. This kind of accusation led unavoidably to extremely harsh sentences – death or long term detentions -, because the goal of these fake judicial processes was to inspire an intense fear so that even the slightest criticisms would be prevented. Once sentenced, the accused was excluded from the “orthodox community” and considered forever as an outcast.

Another feature of these 1930’s trials was that the central power considered it was necessary for the accused to admit to his crimes. It was not possible that he would fight the accusation with ideological, rational or legal arguments. He had to plead guilty, to recognize that he had betrayed the community. It appears that even the evocation of a counter-argument to confront the accusation would constitute, in the eyes of the totalitarian State, a risk of instilling a doubt in the Soviet Union population about the absolute perfection of the orthodox ideology.
At the time of the Moscow trials, there was a wide gap between the promised ideal, the proletarian paradise, and the crude reality of a life in an extremely repressive society. This gap was so wide that it was not possible for anyone to miss it, and, of course, Stalin and his henchmen were acutely aware of this. Thus, it seems that the trials and the harsh sentences delivered were also a way to “fill the gap”, an awkward attempt to patch the ever growing disconnection between the “ideal world” and the “real world”. The fakeness of the accusations and the set-up of the procedures were well known by those ordering the trials, but the rule was that the orthodox could never recognize it publicly : he had, as Raymond Aron wrote, “to follow a discipline of language”, for “the history told by the Party is true, of a higher truth than the mere truth of the material truth of facts” (1).

Arnaud Dubus

(1) L’opium des intellectuels, par Raymond Aron, Hachette Littératures, 2002

Tul Sittisomwong : « Behind the calls for reform of the LM law, there is a hidden agenda”

Question : What do you think about the call for reforming article 112 ?

Tul Sittisomwong : The group which asked for reform of article 112 claims that the punishment is too severe, with a minimum sentence of three years and a maximum sentence of 15 years, which is different from other countries with a monarchy. I agree with some reforms, because some actions should not be punished by three years in jail. But for some other actions, if they are only punished by three years, it is too little. It is a little bit weird that the law covers dirty talk about the king as well as not standing up during the royal anthem. But some people are telling lies about the king, they should be punished more strongly.
So for myself, I think there should be a distinction : if you act like this, you get one, two or three years ; if you act like this, you are punished five to ten years ; if it is something which disturbs national security, it should be higher than ten years. It should be proportionate to the action.
Another thing is when somebody is personally defamed, he usually file charges at the police station by himself. But because the king is the Head of State, he can not be involved with the criminal court. Now, anyone can file charges if there is offense to the king. So, I also agree that there must be some control system, like a committee to consider the complaints. If some Thai knows about someone who did something wrong in connection with LM, he has to send the complaint to that committee first. And if the committee considers that there is a case, he would send it to the attorney general.

People calling for reform of article 112 are also focusing on these two points : the severity of the law, and the fact that anyone can file a case. So, in a way, you agree with them ?

Yes, I agree with that. Now the Peua Thai party is the government, but most of the supporters are Red Shirts and they ask for abolishment of article 112. So we are afraid that if there is a reform of this article, it is going to be eliminated instead of being reformed in order to become more appropriate. That is why I think it is better right now not to do anything about article 112. Even if the punishment would be life sentence or death sentence, I would like to ask anyone willing to commit LM, why are you doing it ? Why ordinary people would tell lies about the king ? It is not about freedom of expression. And the fact is : the Thai King serves Thai people. He has never makes anyone suffer. But because of some broadcast program or internet stories saying “He is doing that, he is involved in this”, and the people believe it. And they talk about the freedom of expression ? Ok, it is freedom if you dislike him, if you dislike the monarchy, but if you announce it publicly, it is going to be punished as in other countries all over the world. The US, Japan, England, every country has a law to protect the Head of State ; it is a question of national security. If you say it is LM, another term is “protecting the Head of State”, but the range of punishments is different from country to country.
Fifty years ago, the punishment was zero to seven years imprisonment. At that time, the LM act in Thailand said, if you infringe upon this act, you should be punished not more than seven years. But in 1975, there was an expansion of communism, and communism tried to get rid of the monarchy system in Thailand. That is why a dictatorial regime appeared. The head of the dictators group changed the punishment from less than seven years to three to fifteen years, and we used it since then.

In the case of Ah Kong, it seems that he did not intend to do anything bad. Still, he was sentenced to 20 years in jail.

First of all, I think that for ordinary people, if they do their job normally, no one would be punished. Secondly, I recognized it was used for political means, but there are very few cases. But after the Thaksin Era and the Red Shirts movement, they give more and more thought to pure or total democracy without the monarchy system. So it is not because more and more people all over the country dislike the king or the monarchy. It is because some political groups try to be number one in Thailand. There is a plan. The number one of Thailand is not the Prime minister, but the King. So they try to get rid of … I think it is a plot. They claim that now the number is surprisingly high, but I think it is not the true number, it is a plot. And the effect is incorrect quotes or lies about the king, it is incorrect information, but some people believe it.
OK, the monarchy or the royal family is not totally correct. There is something… It is not 100 % correct. So if you pick up something wrong to overrule the good side of the monarchy, I think it is not fair. And I think the monarchy is still important for Thai lifestyle and culture.
You know, I think Thai people are not strong enough to stand on their own feet. Especially for politics, they are manipulated by politicians. If some politicians help them with money and other things in life, it is Thai style to pay back by paying respect to them. So the vote is not a free vote, it is different from your country. So we can not get the appropriate representatives through the Thai elections. Many modernized countries ask for free vote, free elections, democracy without monarchy… I and many Thai still believe that democracy with monarchy is suitable and appropriate for Thailand, because it fits Thai people. Thai people are different from French, from British, if Thai would be strong enough like French or British, OK, we may change by still keeping monarchy but differently from now, through a gradual change, not an abrupt change. But the situation now is that some are asking for abrupt change just to support their leader Thaksin Shinawatra… If it would happen anywhere else in the world, in France, in Europe, in the US, these supporters would be jailed.

Do you think the Thai monarchy has to modernize, to become more transparent, more accountable ?

Are you asking if the monarchy has to adapt by itself or through peoples’ suggestions ?

By anyway. Isn't it an old institution which has to adapt as anything else ?

Maybe, you have missed the 2005 King’s speech. He talked about this issue and said that he did not want anyone to be punished for lèse-majesté. And he said he can do wrong and he can be criticized. But on the other hand, in my opinion, the criticisms must be reasonable, not telling lies or trying to provoke abrupt changes like they are doing. If these criticisms are reasonable and aiming at improving monarchy and the country, I agree with that. We have to consider these criticisms on a case by case basis, looking at what is their objective : do they want political change or do they want to make things better ? The ones who want to improve, I think they are not going to be punished. Even if you have to fight the case in court, you can talk to the judge and tell your beliefs and your proposals to make things better, I think everybody can consider it.
Uncle SMS was sentenced on four counts, each with five years, which give a total of 20 years. Many countries and organizations consider that it is too severe. They only look at the punishment but never consider why some ordinary people are doing that. It is not because they have hatred for the king. It is an anti-monarchy team who sent the SMS to the secretary of the former PM Abhisit. Why ? I am sure there is some conspiracy. If one person dislikes the monarchic system, he will not act this way. He would send the message to everybody, on internet.

What do you think of General Prayuth Chan-Ocha remark that people calling for reform of the LM law should go to live outside of Thailand ?

Many people who love the king and the royal family say this for a long time. They are ordinary people. But when the Army Chief says that, it is something, a big thing. I understand what he thinks, his objective. He has no right to push these people away from the country. The objective is not according to the words. You should not put too much into his words. What he tried to say is that the royal family is important and inspire respect in Thailand. He means : instead of speaking about the harshness of the punishment, why are you not trying to avoid committing offenses ? I think it is what he has in his mind, but his personality is straightforward. He thought about this for a long time. Journalist asked him many times this question, so he said : OK, if you talk about this, go away !
About the Freedom of expression, in international agreement, you have some mention that this freedom has to go along with accountability and that your expressions of opinion should not defame other persons or destroy society, national security or the morals. There are some limitations because you live in a society. You are not alone in the world or in the country. This LM law is clearly written for a long time, everybody knows it. So those who ask for reform or to eliminate the law, most of them are not looking to improve things. There is a hidden agenda of getting rid of the monarchy. It is against international agreements.
I think the way to solve this problem is that it is widely discussed, not emotionally, but rationally. But it never happened, like during a seminar in Thammasat, there was a Red Shirts group asking “Get rid of this LM law”. Peaceful talks never happened.

Interview done by Arnaud Dubus

David Streckfuss : « There is a broad consensus in Thailand that the LM law is prone to abuse”

Question : We could have expected the current government to be more lenient on the issue of lèse-majesté. It does not seem to be the case.

David Streckfuss : I am not sure that we can say at this point that the current government has been harsher in the use of the lèse-majesté law, because there are statistics for this year that show that there has been a decrease in the number of cases compared to last year, but it does not break it down month by month. It is probably going to end up with a third of the cases that there was in 2010, for the charges coming before the lower court. So I think it is too early to say what the Peua Thai has been doing with this law until we see more details.
But on the face of it, it seems that the Peua Thai has chosen to distance itself from Red Shirts elements who have been either critical of the institution or critical of the 112 law itself. So that they don’t become themselves accused of being uninterested in the institution, they have to appear even more loyal than the opposition.

Can we say that the lèse-majesté law is not only to protect the royal family, but also a tool to protect a system of power ?

It is reasonable to say at this point that the law itself has come to define the institution, which means that if it were merely a law to protect certain personages we would have one thing. But now, there is a general understanding that the law is there to protect the institution of the monarchy and to protect whatever power system has built up around it. So it is doing a lot more than what a normal defamation law would be doing.


Tul Sittisomwong, a member of Siam Samakki, uses the conspiracy argument against people calling for reform or article 112. Is it a way to undermine any reasonable arguments for reform ?

The idea that there is some sort of conspiracy out there helps to delegitimize and to clothe in negative terms any calls for reform of the law. I would imagine that ultimately yellow shirts groups or multicolor shirts groups or the Siam Samakki group are fearful of what would happen if the law were touched. I think that they feel that the only way the institution can be maintained is by having a very severe law to make sure that it is respected in a certain way.
But I think that there is more and more public awareness of the issue and that this awareness is leading to criticism of at least the law and its continuing threats to basic democratic values and freedoms like freedom of expression. So there has been at some point a delinking between the idea that someone is being worried by the effects of a very harsh law on the state of democracy in Thailand and any sort of position they might have on the institution itself. And before that delinking can happen there will be a lot of accusations of conspiracy theory.
But at the end of the day, that Thailand monarchy becomes more transparent and more accountable to the public is a normal aspect of any constitutional monarchy anywhere else. It is not even clear to me, looking at the law, that it would be necessarily illegal to say that you are a republican and be Thai, to say that : “Nothing personal, but I don’t care for this kind of institution”. That is the common experience of what happens with constitutional monarchies in Europe. There is always between 10 and 20 %, depending on what is going on, who are opposed to the monarchy and want to abolish it. And that is normal. So the day that Sweden for instance has a poll and 74 % of the people decide that they want to keep the institution and the institution will remain in Sweden or somewhere else in Europe, if it would change it would be the end of the institution, but it would be done democratically and that is the main thing.
But in Thailand of course, republican sentiment is thought to be against the law and has been for a long long time.

There is this argument that Thailand is unique, an exception, and it justifies that there should be no change to the institution ?

Yes, the Thai monarchy is very unique in the sense that it gets incredibly harsh laws for modern times and for Thailand aspirations to be a democratic country. So yes, it is very unique in that sense. But in the sense that Thailand has some sorts of unique system of ideas, a unique kind of culture that causes Thai people to be like this or that is a way of isolating Thailand in a sense that many people would not want to do. That kind of thought leads to where Burma was before, or North Korea or nations like that. Thailand has the aspiration of being part of the community of modern nation-states, just like the US who does not listen very much and sees itself sometimes through exceptionalism as well but as some level accepts that there are some rules that should be observed if you want to be called democratic… And I think they are enough people that want Thailand to be democratic and also a monarchy, that are willing to see Thailand open to criticisms for its human rights records in this respect. They don’t want Thailand to be an exception in that sense.


General Prayuth Chan-Ocha said a few days ago that the people who want to reform article 112 should go to live abroad, meaning if you don’t love the King you are not Thai. What do you see behind this linkage between loving the monarchy and being a Thai ?

This is one of the most common aspect of the lèse-majesté charge. It has been around for a long time and it is often part of the lèse-majesté accusation. It seems very ill-advised to set up this kind of dichotomy. There are a lot of things in the news these days that are moving us and becoming very helpful for Thailand to be able to respect and tolerate differences and create a dialogue around it. That statement by General Prayuth was not one of those things.

Thailand is going through a transition from a traditional status-based society to a more participatory society. One of the elements of this transition is the controversy around lèse-majesté. Why is there so much focus on this element and not on other issues, like the financial transparency of the royal family or the obligation to prostate oneself in front of the royals ?

The way that Thainess has been constructed for now a century has, in the last fifty years, involved some aspects of how the institution would play in people’s lives. And I think that there is probably a fear on the side of those who are opposed to any changes of the lèse-majesté law, a fear of what is left then. Because once that factor is taken out, can Thailand unite around, whether rhetorically or not, for instance respect for the constitution or rule of law or democratic values ? It is a quite different thing. I am guessing that those opposed to the reform of the law don’t have any way of conceiving Thainess in a way that would seem to hold the whole thing together. They expect chaos to happen.
I think it will take a big step for everybody to approach the issue. And it has been lucky, because in the last couples of weeks, it is clear that there is a fairly broad consensus in Thai society that the law is prone to abuses. To address it as a rights issue helps a lot to try to fix that, then who knows what happen after that ? Sure it is a big question mark. If the lèse-majesté law were changed, I think there would be a shift in Thai society that no one can exactly predict, especially when the question of succession is so much on people’s minds. So, it is a volatile issue that, I think, scares a lot of people.

Interview done by Arnaud Dubus

« Le maître des aveux », par Thierry Cruvellier : plume acérée, regard pertinent

Il est un grave reproche que l’on doit faire à Thierry Cruvellier, auteur du livre “Le maître des aveux », c’est qu’il n’écrira pas un second volume sur le procès actuellement en cours des trois hauts dirigeants khmers rouges Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary et Khieu Samphan. « Le maître des aveux », qui porte sur le jugement en 2009-2010 de Kaing Guek Eav, alias Douch, chef du centre d’interrogatoire S-21, restera probablement le livre incontournable sur ce procès, comme l’a été le livre d’Hannah Arendt sur le procès d’Eichmann. Il y a plusieurs raisons à cela. D’abord, le fait que l’auteur est un observateur de longue date des tribunaux internationaux. Son œil aguerri n’est pas dupe, il décortique les manœuvres des procureurs, des témoins et des avocats, compare et met en perspective, analyse les meurtriers de masse du Cambodge vis-à-vis des génocidaires d’Arusha. Et il en tire des conclusions importantes sur le fonctionnement de la justice internationale.

Ensuite, l’auteur a suivi sur la longueur, avec sérieux et sens critique les longs mois de cette procédure, tour à tour intense et lassante, historique et prosaïque. Il ne s’invente pas des « face à face, yeux dans les yeux, avec le bourreau », mais s’évertue à comprendre, à décrypter, avec une intelligence souple et un humour souvent corrosif, les complexités de ces débats où les récits s’entrechoquent et les personnalités guerroient. Les grands moments du procès – des témoignages de l’épouse et de la fille du professeur Phung Ton, mort en 1977 à S-21, ou de l’écrivain François Bizot au coup de théâtre final où l’avocat François Roux se trouve trahi à la fois par son co-avocat et son client – sont restitués avec justesse. Comme l’est l’atmosphère si particulière du petit monde qui gravite autour d’un tribunal international et qui n’est pas sans rappeler la communauté se formant autour du tournage d’un film, avant de se dissoudre.

Bien sûr, « Le maître des aveux » ne livre pas toutes les clés, mais il met le doigt sur des points cruciaux pour ceux qui veulent mieux comprendre la dynamique des jugements de crimes contre l’humanité. Ainsi, l’inévitable choc culturel entre les approches des juristes et témoins de différents horizons (pensée circulaire contre pensée linéaire), le cheminement psychologique qui mène un enseignant apprécié de ses élèves à devenir un meurtrier de masse, l’obsession de la pureté qui entraine le régime dans une dynamique paranoïaque… Contrairement à Douch, deux des trois leaders khmers rouges actuellement en cours de jugement – Nuon Chea et Ieng Sary – refusent de coopérer avec le tribunal. La seconde audience lors de laquelle Nuon Chea a rejeté la responsabilité des atrocités sur le « frère ennemi » vietnamien donne une idée de l’impasse dans lequel ce second procès pourrait aboutir. Quant à Khieu Samphan, il est à craindre que ses réponses ne différeront pas beaucoup de son opuscule « l’histoire récente du Cambodge et les raisons derrière les décisions que j’ai prises » publié au début des années 2000. A la fin de cet ouvrage, il affirmait : « dans la hiérarchie rigide du Kampuchéa Démocratique (le régime khmer rouge), j’étais une sorte de subalterne ».

Arnaud Dubus

Don’t miss it on your favorite channel : The Floods, the watery soap opera

Forget Dok Som Si Thong (Golden Orange Blossom) and Roi Mai (silk thread), the soap opera not to be missed these days is Naam Tuom (The Floods), which is played on all channels and will bring you all the usual ingredients – the heroes, the drama, the tears, the monsters…- plus the thrill of watching a non-stop reality show. The hero or Phra Aek is the veteran actor Sorayuth, a kind of massive demi-god whose voice resonates like thunder as he crisscrosses the country on boat with a cryptic encircled diagram on his breast : 3. Surrounded by supporting casting, feet in the water, he gives his oracles and predictions as provincial figurants are floating in the background. He is a real Phra Aek, fearless and generous, distributing thousands of rescue bags marked with his diagram, but there are also failed heroes in the drama, like Plodprasob Suraswadee, the billionaire minister of Science, who unsuccessfully tried to take the centre stage by triggering an ill-advised full scale floods alert for the residents of Northern Bangkok on 13th October.
Every keen lakorn watcher knows that a good soap must have a lot of tears, salty water drops rolling down the cheeks for minutes and minutes which express a state of intense internal dismay. The Floods is no exception, and it was a poignant moment to see Kittirat na Ranong, the Deputy Prime Minister, bursting into tears in the arms of a puzzled Japanese investor. Kittirat had stoically contained his emotions for a number of weeks in face of thousands of provincial villagers whose houses half disappeared in flood waters. But the water invading the Hi Tech industrial estate in Ayuthaya was to much to bear. The wall this sensible man had built within himself in order to perform his duty to the best of his abilities burst out with the dyke.
Then who are the bad guys in the story ? Those who sport a moustache of course ! Actually, Chuwit Kamolvisit, again, pointed at the nasty characters lurking in the (flooded) sideways : pirates who raid empty houses and money thirsty boat owners who racket helpless flood victims. Another tempting question is to ask if Yingluck is the nang aek of the drama. It is maybe too early to say ; in any case, she had better be careful nobody else steal the show.

Arnaud Dubus

Who killed ... ?

Who killed king Ananda Mahidol in June 1946 ? We don’t know.

Who killed Muslim leaders Haji Sulong and Ahmad Tohmeena in 1954 ? We don’t know.

Who killed the protesters in October 1973 ? We don’t know.

Who killed Socialist party leader Boonsanong Punyodyana in February 1976 ? We don’t know.

Who killed the students in Thammasart university in October 1976 ? We don’t know.

Who killed Union leader Tanong Po-arn in 1991 ? We don’t know.

Who killed the protesters in May 1992 ? We don’t know.

Who killed muslim lawyer Somchai Neelaipajitr in March 2004 ? We don’t know.

Who killed the Tak Bai protestors in October 2004 ? We don't know.

Who killed Japanese journalist Hiroyuki Muramoto in April 2010 ? We don’t know.

Who killed Italian journalist Fabio Polenghi in May 210 ? We don’t know.

Who killed assistant-nurse Kate Akahad and fiver other persons in Wat Pathum Wanaram in May 2010 ? We don’t know.

What is doing the Royal Thai Police ? They are busy filing lèse-majesté charges against journalist Chiranuch Premchaiporn.

The unbearable lightness of Thai culture

The ownership claim by Thailand of the jeeb gesture, a gracious hand movement of the Ramakien epic, and of the shadow theater using large leather figures (nang yai) is considered as a priority for Mrs Sukumol Kunplome, the new minister of culture. It is hard not to spot an hint of nationalism behind this move as it is a reaction to the registration by Cambodia of the Royal Khmer Ballet and of their own version of shadow theater on the Intangible cultural heritage list of UNESCO in 2008. But more importantly, it allows us to dig into this notion of “Thai culture” which is continuously emphasized by various government agencies as a supposed pillar of the Thai way of being.

In this official format, Thai culture is rather restrictive. It includes mostly the court culture (royal rituals, khon, ramakien, buddhist ceremonies) and some aspects of the commoners culture, as Thai boxing or regional dances. Curiously, some villagers’ traditions are discarded and never presented by officials as part of the Thai heritage, as for instance betel chewing or cock fighting, even if the carrying of betel boxes was, in the past, a sign of rank. This bureaucratic approach to culture divides cultural behaviors and habits into “proper” and “improper” : wearing a sarong is improper but joining palms to wai is proper ; speaking the ratchasap (royal language) is proper but speaking the earthy northeastern Lao dialect is improper. This narrow idea of culture also tends to ignore various creative ventures by young and old artists, who are deemed too uncontrollable to fit the rigid framework. It is not an all-encompassing notion of culture, aiming to celebrate the diversity and creativity of the multiple groups and talents belonging to the country, but a defensive culture, choosy about its picks and always weary of opening up and sharing. In 2002, the minister of Culture, Pongphol Adireksarn, famously proposed a draft law aiming to ban the teaching of Thai boxing and Thai massage to foreigners so that “Thai wisdom stays in the hands of the Thais”.

By claiming ownership of the jeeb gesture and the shadow theatre, the official Thai culture is on its ground : what has been integrated formally in Thai culture has become sacred and inviolable. In face of such dogmatism, it is tempting to hint at the Indian origin of Ramakien - a reality sometimes ignored, as showed by an upper-class lady telling me : “Oh, do they also have Ramayana in India ?” - or at the popularity of shadow theater in the Malay world. Such ownership claims asserted by the Thai minister of culture are a little bit like saying that Celtic music belongs to French Britanny. The same twisted logic explains why some Thai archeologists use the category “Lopburi style” to speak about Angkor style monuments. There is a process of Thai-isation of foreign inputs, which is perfectly fine as long as cultural history is not denied. Nobody owns culture.

Going further, the world of Thai culture is mired in contradictions. As i was asking in a large book store for a copy in Thai of the classic Khun Chang Khun Paen, an employee took a long time to painfully retrieve a unique copy hidden on a shelf. But no less than four different Thai versions of the Chinese epic “Three Kingdoms” (sam kok) were exhibited behind the main cashier counter. Chineseness is an important part of the Thai way of being, especially in large urban areas, but why such a fundamental Thai classic as Khun Chang Khun Paen is not widely available in bookstores ? Should this book be the Jewell of Thai culture ? It is not particular to Thailand. In Indonesia, the great javanese epic “The Book of Centhini”, store of much of the island's ancient culture, had never been translated in bahasa indonesia until a few years ago. It was translated into Indonesian and then French at the end of the 1990s under a project coordinated by writer Elisabeth Inandiak.

Arnaud Dubus

Beyond the call of duty

For some time i have been intrigued by the Thai expression pathibat natee (ปฏิบัติ หน้าที่) or “accomplishing his duty”. Repeatedly said by politicians and bureaucrats during discourses, in front of courts of justice and in reply to embarrassing questions, it has a mantra-like quality that is found in many other overused Thai expressions. In the last few weeks, I found this expression in various news items. One was quoting the current army chief, general Prayuth Chan-Ocha, explaining that military officers and rank and file military should not be worried by the coming change of government, in regard to the brutal repression of the Red shirts demonstrations of April-May last year. “Why should we be worried, because we have accomplished our duty ?”, he said. In another article, it was said that the policemen who killed a seven year old boy during an operation to catch a drug trafficker in the course of the infamous “war on drugs” in 2003, had received reduced sentences of a few months in jail by the court, because they killed the boy “while accomplishing their duty”.

Obviously, something was amiss. Can we say that a taxi driver who crush a passer-by on the road can be forgiven because he was “accomplishing his duty” - driving his car in quest of customers ? In which country the killing of tenth of mostly unarmed civilians by security forces would be considered as part of their duties ? There seems to be, here, a play on the words, a semantic trick to justify the unjustifiable.

Of course, much depends on what meaning you give to “duty” ? When I was a conscript in the French army in the mid-eighties, a young officer made a speech during the very first day of our training period. He said that, if an officer gave us an order to shoot into a crowd of civilians, he hoped that we would have the common sense and determination to refuse to follow the order “because the French army is a citizens’ army”. Obviously, for this officer, duty included something else that the blind obedience to whatever command was received from the hierarchy. So there is a sense of duty which is wider than the narrow focus on “doing his job” without any considerations of the broader implications. This higher sense of duty is based on the respect of the right of others, on some basic moral principles, on the use of the brain and on the will to be not only a mechanical part of a larger machine. In Thailand, the narrow focus on “duty” appears to be mostly a corporatist protective tool for the bureaucracy : whatever wrong is done, there is always a way to land back on his feet by saying “Well, there was a large loss of life, but I stuck to the bureaucratic rules”. To the letter of the rules, that is, but not to the spirit, because you can always manipulate the letter the way you want.

Another element is the absence of a built-in punishment system in case of wrong doing. A journalist who distorts facts will be fired. A businessman who invests in loosing ventures will be ruined. He won’t be able to cover his failure by saying that he “did his duty”. “Accomplishing his duty” has then to be seen as the fig leaf of bureaucrats. And every time we hear this expression, we should enter rebellion.

Arnaud Dubus

The imagined world of Thai soap operas

A striking feature of most of the Thai soap operas is the extremely stereotyped social milieu they represent. 90 % of the soap operas are set in upper bourgeois milieu, displaying very wealthy families living in palatial homes surrounded by a bevy of maids and servants. It does not actually represent an existing social milieu, but is more an imagined high class-society, where young men and women devote their whole time to romantic intrigues and, seemingly, are disencumbered from the contingencies of professional life. This idealization of the social setting is reinforced by the endless reproduction of the same features from one series to another. The wide diversity of the life situations in the country is obliterated and replaced by a narrow range of models.

Another trait is the constant reminder of the rules of social hierarchy. There are often two sets of people, the “masters” and the “servants”. Within the masters’ world, there is strife and competition, joy and tears, unions and break up. The servants are only shown as a reflection of their masters’ world : they gossip about them, assess their behavior with a childish naivety in the secret confines of the kitchen, but their own life and destiny have no interest in the plot. There is only one kind of interaction between the two groups : the servants are attending, with submissiveness and obedience, their masters. They cater to their every whim and never revolt. They are there to enhance the social greatness of their masters.

The characters are as much stereotyped as the social milieu. There is the mother, sporting a khunying-style hairdo, wise and protective, who has long accepted the vagaries of her husband. There are the daughters - either the dutiful one, pride of her parents, who has only one aspiration : to lead a quiet and moral life with her husband ; either the bitch-type, inclined on stealing husbands and destroying the life of harmonious couples. The sons follow a similar dual pattern.

The locations in which the plot is developing are also limited : the splendid living rooms where discussions within the families or with a few selected visitors – often prospective fiancés – take place in the comfort of leather sofas or mother-of-pearl inlaid Chinese furniture at the foot of extravagant neo-classical winding staircases, the VVIP hospital rooms where one of the character will recover from some ailment, the sport cars where the trendy teenagers will tease each other or quarrel… You won’t see them walking in a normal street among normal people, or shop at Big C. They are living on a higher plane, like demi-gods on the flanks of Mount Meru.

One of the messages of these series is that the existing social hierarchy is a fact of life, a natural evidence which does not need to be justified. The idealized setting is presented as a model to get inspiration from or even to copy. Verbal expressions, physical attitudes, type of furniture and indoor design, dressing style and life situations are being reproduced in real life, not by the actual upper middle classes, but more by a petty and middle bourgeoisie avid to project the image of them playing in a superior category.

Interestingly, the few series which are taking place in the “countryside” are also set in a unreal, idealized world : sprawling traditional wooden mansions where the up-country masters would wear traditional costumes. Servants in Rama IV clothing style would prostrate themselves at their feet. Probably nowhere in today Thailand you can see such scenes outside of theaters and cultural centers. Don’t expect here to have a glimpse of the half urbanized provincial small towns where rice fields are fast replaced by housing villages, and which constitute the current reality of much of Thai countryside. Again, reflecting the real world is not the aim, but rather to influence the real worlds with imagined models.

Perhaps, the creators of these series consider that they have to make their audiences dream or aspire to higher materialistic success and that they must not be reminded of their real situation in life. Perhaps, the words of the consumer products companies which sponsor these series are dictating the rules of the game. The extreme focus on syrupy romantic intrigues leave no space for hints of social issues (drugs, inequality, poverty, aids, relation between various ethnic communities, between Thai and Farangs…) and even less for political content. Nobody expects a soap opera to deal with being and nothingness, but it would be imaginable that it stays enjoyable and, at the same time, treats his viewers as more adult.

Arnaud Dubus

Willam J. Klausner on Thai Troubled Politics (part 2)

Of prime importance in beginning the process towards achieving mutual trust and empathy is the need to decipher the underlying causes of the so-called rural-urban divide and to address them. As a son-in-law of the northeast, I will focus on isaan when commenting on rural society. The stereotype of villagers largely held by those in urban society must be challenged and overcome. Urban society is largely in the throes of a serious cultural lag as it still sees rural folk as uneducated and narrow minded provincials. Such a view no longer represents either the social or political reality. Rural society has undergone a cosmic change during the past half century which urban dwellers often simply refuse to recognize or accept. Rural society has evolved from a barter focused sustainable economy to a cash and consumer oriented society. Mutual help/reciprocal labor has given way to hired laborers who even follow service hours. Family labor has markedly decreased as the norm of five or six children has given the way to only one, two or three children at the most, and the younger generation is now pursuing higher education and careers beyond the village. The limit of a four year primary education has long since passed as many of the younger generation have completed high school and gone on to college and university.

Villagers’ understanding of the world beyond their rural confines has expanded significantly as mobility markedly increased beginning in the mid-sixties. Villagers have left to work in the provincial centers, in Bangkok and further abroad in Middle East, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan etc… In most villages today, off-farm income in greater than in-farm income. And advances in communication technologies and rural electrification have resulted in villagers no longer being dependent on the rural focused bamboo radio or rice harp. They have become connected and conversant with urban worlds via television, newspapers, radios, computers/internet, DVDs, mobile and land line phones.

Rural society more and more, has taken on the trappings of the city with increased gambling, drugs, debt, competition and consumerism etc… Villagers have, thus, become “cosmopolitan villagers”, and when found working in urban environment, they become “rural cosmopolitans”. One should remember former villagers working in Bangkok are generally in low paid jobs and identify themselves with the urban poor. One might go even further and say villagers have a better understanding of what it means to be a Thai citizen, in its fullest and most inclusive sense, as they understand both worlds unlike urban folk who have become provincial ensconced in their more narrow environment.

If those in urban areas are to fully understand and empathize with villagers, there must be a realization that villagers, besides being better educated and tuned into the world outside, have overcome their antipathy to confrontation and to a total reliance on karma as an explanation of their disadvantaged state. The villagers are increasingly ready to openly confront authority. While there have been several factors that have influenced such attitudinal changes, the fact they now have political cover to challenge and confront authority should be recognized.

However, the villagers’ main argument is with officialdom, persons of influence, including businessmen at the provincial level, who treat them with not so disguised disdain. The villagers no longer have to rely on the indirect weapons of the weak with dealing with authority, including songs and folk tales where those in positions of authority are bested by common folk. They are now ready to demand that they be respected and treated fairly ; that they be valued for their local wisdom ; that their dignity and worth be recognized. They want those they vote for to remain in power and to respond to their needs in terms of gaining a larger share of the material benefits pie. Though they have an increased level of social and political consciousness, this does not mean, at this stage, that they are committed to structural changes necessary to bring about liberal democratic governance.
If perceptions of rural society changes become more realistic, perhaps we will increasingly view the glass of the Thai body politic as half full, not half empty. I would be happy to define further important changes in village society over the past decades if time permits and it is deemed relevant to do so.

Lastly, one might profitably discuss the role play of the Sangha as a factor militating against resolution of conflicts and tensions in Thai society today. At the village level, the monks, with a few exception, no longer play a role as community leaders in the secular lives of the villagers. With the exception of meditation adepts and charismatic “development monks” engaged in community development programs, most of the rural Sangha confines itself to religious teachings and participation in rituals and ceremonies. Many northeastern temples have only a few elder monks in residence. This change in role play has been influenced by the intrusion of the State in areas previously the province of Sangha, increased educational opportunities for the youth and a cash and consumer oriented society. In Bangkok, resident monks from the northeast have become entangled in confrontational and divisive behavior as they openly participate in political protests. It would appear, to paraphrase an old saying, “you can take the monk out of the village, but you cannot take the village out of the monk”. As with their lay protestors, the monks have their own hidden agendas. As they join in protesting and confronting authority, they are indirectly protesting against an authoritarian gentocracy that administers the Sangha.

It maybe pointed out that a majority of the student body at the two Buddhist universities in Bangkok come from the northeast and many more live in Wats almost exclusively composed of northeast monks and temple boys, for example, Wat Sapathum, Wat Noranad, Wat Prasrimahatad, Wat Takian etc… Such political involvement of monks is in contradiction of the rules of discipline (vinai) and to a previously unwritten agreement on the part of the State authorities, lay Buddhist leaders and the Council of Elders that any political involvement was both inappropriate and forbidden. During recent political protests, monks from up-country, as well as Bangkok based monks, were actively involved and, yet, the Sangha authorities issued no statement cautioning monks to avoid such involvement. This does not bode well for the future of the Sangha, a traditional moral voice for moderation and conciliation, has become enmeshed in divisive, political conflicts.

I hope the above comments on the not so controlled chaos of the Thai body politic today will be taken in the constructive spirit intended.

Professor William J. Klausner
Senior Fellow, ISIS Thailand
30th September 2010

William J. Klausner on Thai Politics at ISIS (Chula U), Part One

I wish to thanks Ajahn Jay (Thitinan Pongsudhirak) for providing me with the opportunity to participate in this conference and to further a dialogue I have pursued with Paul (Wedel) and especially with Jim (Stent) who has been a favorite interlocutor over the past several decades.

As an aging absent minded professor who has lived in Thailand for fifty years and is now well into his anecdote age, the trajectory of the past weighs more heavily than that of the future.

However, that can be useful in interpreting Thailand’s troubles today. The past is very much a central part of the present conflicts and tensions in Thai society. Despite the dramatic transformation of Thai society in the past half century and the realization that “the future is not what is was”, the past, as William Faulkner noted, “is not dead. It’s not even past”. The traditional past was rooted in hierarchy, in both its values and institutions. Though there was a surface stability, social, economic, political and legal inequalities prevailed.

These hierarchical structures and values have a remarkable staying power and are ever present in traditional centers of power as they shape the behavior, attitudes and perspectives of bureaucracy, police, army, judiciary, medical profession etc… However they have come under increasing pressure and challenge from an opposing set of antithetical core values associated with globalization, civil society and liberal democracy that emphasize individualism, egalitarianism, rule of law, popular participation, good governance. In the long run, it will be the resolution of this conflict and the form it takes that will determine both the style of governance and the extent to which there will be a more just and equitable society. Given the accelerating pressures, including a rising political and social consciousness on the part of the rural electorate, reforms in all sectors of society will ultimately have to be undertaken, however long it takes and despite continuing opposition.

Such reforms will be necessary across the board in education, in the legal sphere, in economic and political structures and in the channeling outside input into policy formulation and implementation. There must be also the political will to undertake these reforms in an atmosphere of civil and rational discourse. As one of the characters of the Italian novel “The Guepard” cautioned an establishment elder : “If you want things to stay the same, things will have to change”.

At present, the above conflict between the two forces mentioned has been somewhat muted and under the radar. Civil society and third force centrist elements have found little social and political space to make their voices heard. Though there are those who are truly committed to liberal democratic values in all color co-ordinated camps, they do not represent a critical mass. There seems to be little effort to wean away these democratic elements and have them join together with civil society to forge a centrist political force to be reckoned with. Despite the banners extolling democracy held high by one and all, the struggle today seems to be rather one for power and authority with little expectation that there would be any significant change in the form of governance. Mutual trust and empathy, as well as readiness to conciliate, compromise and accommodate, are largely absent. Zero sum attitudes prevail.

Whether in the short or long term, one cannot proceed towards reconciliation resolution and productive synergy of opposing forces unless there is mutual trust and a deeper understanding of the fissures and divisions in all their complexities so prevalent in Thai society today. (to follow…).